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LIMITING IDENTITY IN CRIMINAL LAW 
MIHAILIS E. DIAMANTIS* 
Abstract: People change with time. Personalities, values, and preferences shift 
incrementally as people accrue life experience, discover new sources of meaning, 
and form or lose memories. Eventually, accumulated psychological changes not 
only reshape how someone relates to the world about her, but also who she is as a 
person. This transience of human identity has profound implications for criminal 
law. Previous legal scholarship on personal identity has assumed that only abrupt 
tragedy and disease can change who we are. Psychologists, however, now know 
that the ordinary processes of growth, maturation, and decline alter us all in fun-
damental respects. Many young adults find it hard to identify with their adoles-
cent past. Senior citizens often reflect similarly on their middle years. However 
tightly we hold on to the people we are today, at some tomorrow we inevitably 
find ourselves changed.  
Criminal justice has not come to grips with this aspect of the human condition. 
The law—by imposing lengthy sentences, allowing enduring consequences of 
conviction, and punishing long bygone violations—assumes that people’s identi-
ties remain fixed from birth to death. If people do change with time, these poli-
cies must violate criminal law’s most basic commitment to prosecute and punish 
present-day people only for crimes they (and not some different past person) 
committed.  
Drawing on contemporary psychology and philosophy of personal identity, this 
Article concludes that criminal law punishes too often and too severely. Lengthy 
prison terms risk incarcerating people past the point at which their identity 
changes. Elderly inmates who have languished on death row for decades should 
have a new claim for release—that they are now different people, innocent of the 
misdeeds of yesteryear. One-time felons should recover lost civil rights sooner. 
And defendants should benefit from juvenile process well into their twenties, 
when personal identity first begins to stabilize. By confronting the challenges 
posed by the limits of personal identity, the criminal law can become more just 
and humane. 
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“You didn’t get [the scholarship]. You were never gonna get it . . . . You 
made a mistake and they are never forgetting it. As far as they’re con-
cerned, your mistake is just, it’s who you are.” 
—Jimmy McGill, Better Call Saul1 
“Get back in your cell . . . . I came to kill Neegan, and you’re already 
worse than dead.” 
—Maggie Greene, The Walking Dead2 
INTRODUCTION 
Inattention to the effects of time is a major contributor to several patholo-
gies in the U.S. criminal justice system,3 from overcriminalization to overin-
carceration.4 We let some people waste away in prison. We leave others in a 
timeless limbo on death row. We convict for crimes from long long ago. And 
we prosecute children who have not reached the time of adulthood. By heeding 
the moral significance of time, we could uncover a more unified framework for 
addressing these and other injustices. This Article argues that the key to this 
moral significance is a deeper appreciation for the temporal limits of personal 
identity.5 “Time is a powerful force that transforms people’s preferences, re-
shapes their values, and alters their personalities.”6 Ineluctably, the march of 
time changes all of us. Our refusal to recognize this distorts criminal justice. 
Sometimes time changes identity in obvious, stark, and tragic ways. Con-
sider portraits of two men: 
                                                                                                                 
 1 Better Call Saul: Winner (AMC television broadcast Oct. 8, 2018). 
 2 The Walking Dead: What Comes After (AMC television broadcast Nov. 4, 2018). 
 3 This Article is meant to supplement rather than challenge other important accounts of these 
pathologies; inattention to the effects of time in the criminal justice system is an outgrowth of broader 
social systems that work to systematically disadvantage racial minorities. See, e.g., TODD R. CLEAR, 
IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBOR-
HOODS WORSE 3 (2007) (describing how the increases in criminalization and incarceration dispropor-
tionately affect marginalized communities); Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and 
the Life Course: Race and Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151, 151 (2004) 
(studying the lifetime risks of imprisonment across race and educational achievements). 
 4 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLOR-
BLINDNESS 8–9 (rev. ed. 2012); DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 3–45 (2008) (providing a detailed account of the various mechanisms in which we 
over-prosecute individuals). 
 5 This Article is not the only account for why the passage of time is significant for criminal pun-
ishment. See, e.g., Shawn J. Bayern, The Significance of Private Burdens and Lost Benefits for a Fair-
Play Analysis of Punishment, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 42 (2009) (arguing that as time passes, the 
benefits that a criminal realizes from a crime fade, and correspondingly, so too should the severity of 
their punishment). 
 6 Jordi Quoidbach et al., The End of History Illusion, 339 SCI. MAG. 96, 96 (2013). 
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[Man 1] killed [a police officer] during a domestic dispute. At the request 
of [Man 1’s] neighbors, [the officer] was protecting [Man 1’s] ex-girlfriend 
and her 11-year-old daughter while [Man 1] moved out of their house. Af-
ter pretending to leave, [Man 1] retrieved a pistol, crept behind the car 
where [the officer] was sitting, and fired two shots into the back of [the of-
ficer’s] head . . . . After shooting [the officer], [Man 1] shot his ex-
girlfriend in the back as she tried to run away.7 
[Man 2] has a history of physical and mental impairments. He is legally 
blind, cannot walk independently, is incontinent, and has slurred speech. 
He has also suffered at least two recent strokes . . . [one of which] was se-
vere, and affected [his] vision while also causing substantial deficit in mo-
tor coordination. After this stroke, he showed signs of memory loss, repeat-
edly asking that his mother be informed that he had a stroke despite the fact 
that she had passed away several years earlier . . . . [Man 2] report[s] fre-
quently urinating on himself . . . although he has a toilet [nearby].8 
Man 2 faces execution for Man 1’s crime. Both men respond to the name 
“Vernon Madison,” but, due to a series of strokes and a degenerative brain dis-
order, Man 2 (age sixty-eight) cannot recall being Man 1 (age thirty-four).9 
Despite the very palpable sense that these must be two different men, the law 
currently treats them as though they were one and the same10—that only the 
passage of time separates them. This would immediately strike many psy-
chologists and philosophers of identity as suspect.11 In addition to time, a psy-
chological gulf separates the two. Memory in particular has been thought to 
play a crucial role in connecting past and present selves into a single coherent 
identity.12 Under the current legal framework, Man 2 will be executed unless 
he can somehow persuade the courts that killing him would be cruel and unu-
sual.13 If Man 2 does not share Man 1’s identity, he should instead be able to 
argue that he is innocent of Man 1’s crimes. 
                                                                                                                 
 7 Brief of Respondent at 3, Madison v. Alabama (Madison I), 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019) (No. 17-
7505), 2018 WL 3655848. 
 8 Madison v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr. (Madison II), 851 F.3d 1173, 1179 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 9 Id. at 1177. 
 10 See Madison I, 139 S. Ct. at 722 (“[A] person lacking such a memory [of the time of his crime] 
may still be able to form a rational understanding of the reasons for his death sentence [and therefore 
his execution need not violate the Eighth Amendment.]”). 
 11 See infra notes 58−174 and accompanying text. 
 12 See John Locke, Of Identity and Diversity, in PERSONAL IDENTITY 33, 51 (John Perry ed., 
1975) (emphasizing the role memory plays in personal identity). 
 13 Brief of Petitioner at 1, Madison I, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019) (No. 17-7505), 2018 WL 2383228. 
The Supreme Court held that regardless of whether a person remembers his crime, he may still face 
execution under the Eighth Amendment if he can reasonably understand the justifications for his sen-
tence. Madison I, 139 S. Ct. at 726. The case was remanded to the state court to determine Madison’s 
competency. Id. at 731. 
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A very long stretch of time and debilitating illness stand between Vernon 
Madison and his past self.14 This Article embraces,15 where some others have 
demurred,16 the relevance of personal identity to capital sentencing in cases 
like Madison’s. The significance of time for criminal justice reaches far be-
yond extreme cases like Madison’s. Natural and often unnoticed changes in 
personal identity affect us all, over shorter time scales, and usually without the 
intervention of tragic disorders. The ubiquitous transience of personal identity 
implicates everyone. 
Psychologists have demonstrated how personal identity changes and why 
it is often hard for us to see or acknowledge this. Reflect for a moment: on a 
scale from zero (not at all) to ten (totally), how much do you think you will 
change as a person over the next decade? Most people think their personality, 
values, and preferences will remain relatively stable into the future. They an-
swer close to zero.17 Now reflect for a second moment: how much have you 
changed as a person in the last decade? Most people answer this question very 
differently; looking backward, they recognize that a process of personal 
growth brought them to who they presently are.18 The law review editors 
working on this article (assuming they are in their late twenties) will tend to 
answer close to 9, 5.5, and 4 for how much they changed in terms of values, 
preferences, and personality, respectively, over the last decade.19 Scientists call 
this discrepancy between the past change people observe in themselves and the 
forward-looking stability they predict the “end of history illusion.”20 
This Janus-faced perspective people have toward their own identities can 
also influence how people think about others’ identities. The epigraphs fea-
tured at the top of this Article illustrate two common and conflicting thoughts 
we have all likely entertained. In the first, Jimmy McGill explains to a young 
student why a scholarship committee rejected her application.21 She had a mi-
nor shoplifting infraction in her recent past.22 In the eyes of the committee 
members, she would always be the thief, and such a person would not benefit 
from, let alone deserve, a scholarship.23 In the second, Maggie Greene, bent on 
                                                                                                                 
 14 Madison II, 851 F.3d at 1177. 
 15 See infra notes 421−579 and accompanying text. 
 16 See, e.g., Chad Flanders, Time, Death, and Retribution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 464–66 
(2016) (arguing that it is unrealistic to expect criminal law to adapt by incorporating identity changes 
in determining proper punishments). 
 17 Quoidbach et al., supra note 6, at 97. 
 18 See id. at 96 (“Young people, middle-aged people, and older people all believed that they 
changed a lot in the past but would change relatively little in the future.”). 
 19 Id. at 97. 
 20 Id. at 96.  
 21 Better Call Saul, supra note 1. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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vengeance against the man who had brutally murdered her husband, finds him 
locked in a holding cell, a broken and subdued shadow of the arrogant tyrant 
he once was.24 Though she recognizes his face, she no longer sees the culprit 
she sought to destroy.25 
These two perspectives on personal identity—that it is either fixed from 
crib to grave or that it changes over time—have important implications for 
criminal law. Attributions of criminal responsibility presuppose that the pre-
sent-day defendant must be identical to whoever committed the past crime. 
This so-called “identity principle” is a requirement of basic morality: it stands 
for the notion that responsibility tracks identity.26 Punishing one person for 
another’s crime is harmful to the criminal justice system27—it violates consti-
tutional guarantees of due process28 and offends fundamental common law 
notions of justice.29 Therefore, it matters to law and morality whether identities 
change despite continuity in physical DNA, physiognomy, fingerprints, social 
network, social security number, et cetera. 
Despite the central importance of the identity principle, current criminal 
law lacks a coherent approach to personal identity. Jurists have largely over-
looked identity and its implications for criminal law. Not a single court case 
cites to Derek Parfit, the modern philosopher whose name has been synony-
mous with personal identity theory for decades.30 The identity principle does 
                                                                                                                 
 24 The Walking Dead, supra note 2.  
 25 Id. 
 26 JOSEPH BUTLER, THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION, NATURAL AND REVEALED 335–43 (6th ed. 
1764); Thomas Reid, Of Memory, in ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN 253, 264–67 
(Derek R. Brookes ed., 2002); Locke, supra note 12, at 51; Derek Parfit, Later Selves and Moral 
Principles, in PHILOSOPHY AND PERSONAL RELATIONS: AN ANGLO-FRENCH STUDY 137, 142–44 
(Alan Montefiore ed., 1973). 
 27 Although there may appear to be exceptions—e.g. co-conspirators, parents responsible for the 
crimes of their children, and accomplices responsible for each other’s crimes—these are not true cases 
of vicarious liability. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946) (holding that a co-
conspirator is responsible for the actions taken by another co-conspirator if the acts are in furtherance 
of the conspiracy); Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 508 (Cal. 1993) (describing a statute that holds 
a parent criminally liable for causing, encouraging, or contributing to a dependent’s criminal activity); 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE I] (stating 
that a person is considered guilty of another’s criminal action if he or she is an accomplice). Although 
the criminal result is necessary for liability, so is the criminal act or omission of the vicariously liable 
defendant—e.g. a criminal agreement, criminal aid, a failure to supervise, or failure to exercise rea-
sonable care and control over their children. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE I § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (stating 
that a person is an accomplice of another if, with the intent to facilitate the offense, he or she helps 
another to commit the crime; id. § 5.03(1) (describing when a person is guilty of conspiracy with 
another). The defendants in these cases stand trial for their own responsibility in relation to the harm. 
 28 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 29 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *276 (1830) (“[I]t is better that ten guilty per-
sons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”).  
 30 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on personal identity and ethics uses Derek 
Parfit’s name fifty-one times. David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics, in STANFORD ENCY-
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not assert which theory of identity is correct, just that identity and responsibil-
ity go hand-in-hand. Although theorists dispute exactly how identity works, it 
cannot be both fixed and changing. Currently, criminal law draws inconsistent-
ly from both views. All jurisdictions allow for life sentences,31 and some states 
indefinitely remove basic civil rights from convicted felons.32 Such policies 
suggest that criminal law treats personal identity as stable throughout life. All 
jurisdictions also have features that, as argued below, are best understood as 
recognizing that identity changes and has natural temporal limits. The special 
criminal process accorded to juveniles33 may be an implicit acknowledgment 
that adults often share little common identity with the children they once 
were.34 Furthermore, statutes of limitations35 may be an implicit concession 
                                                                                                                 
CLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, §§ 1–2, 4–6 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/identity-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/NKN6-L942].  
 31 MODEL PENAL CODE I § 6.06(1) (“A person who has been convicted of a [first degree] felony 
may be sentenced to . . . life imprisonment.”); Ashley Nellis, Still Life: America’s Increasing Use of 
Life and Long-Term Sentences, THE SENT’G PROJECT, 1, 10 (May 2017), https://www.sentencing
project.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Still-Life.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9JF-TCTV] (offering a 
comprehensive analysis of individuals serving life sentences across all fifty states). 
 32 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (upholding state disenfranchisement of 
convicted felons); Amy Heath, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Denying Ex-Felons the Right to Vote 
After Serving Their Sentences, 25 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 327, 329 (2017) (“[N]early 6.1 
million ex-felons . . . face nearly insurmountable barriers when trying to gain back their right to vote. 
Six states currently disenfranchise more than seven percent of its adult population.”); Brian C. Kalt, 
The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 67 (2003) (“Thirteen million peo-
ple, including about thirty percent of black men, are banned for life from jury service because they are 
felons.”). Florida recently changed its policy of indefinitely disenfranchising felons. FLA. CONST. art. 
VI, § 4; Patricia Mazzei, Florida Felons Once Denied Rights Begin Registering to Vote, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/us/florida-felons-voting-rights.html [https://
perma.cc/4JNC-PPNK]. Many other states, however, retain such a policy. Heath, supra, at 329. Addi-
tionally, the U.S. Code makes it illegal for convicted felons to possess a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) 
(2012). 
 33 Anne Teigen, Automatically Sealing or Expunging Juvenile Records, LEGISBRIEF (Nat’l Conf. 
of St. Legislatures, Washington, D.C.) (July 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
J94ePAC8WFw%3d&tabid=30515&portalid=1 [https://perma.cc/C66X-G3RS] (“All states have 
some sort of procedures that allow juveniles to petition to either seal or expunge their records in cer-
tain cases.”). 
 34 Peter Anderson, Assessment and Development of Executive Function (EF) During Childhood, 8 
CHILD NEUROPSYCHOL. 71, 77 (2002) (“Research indicates that the executive domains mature at 
different rates.”); Avshalom Caspi & Brent W. Roberts, Personality Development Across the Life 
Course: The Argument for Change and Continuity, 12 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 49, 61 (2001) (“The evi-
dence does not support the conclusion that personality traits become fixed at a certain age in adult-
hood. Rather the existence of personality change well into adulthood, though often small in magni-
tude, contradicts attempts to claim that personality traits are fixed or unchanging.”); Rodica Ioana 
Damian et al., Sixteen Going on Sixty-Six: A Longitudinal Study of Personality Stability and Change 
Across 50 Years, 117 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 674, 674 (2018) (“Our findings suggest that 
personality has a stable component across the life span, both at the trait level and at the profile level, 
and that personality is also malleable and people mature as they age.”). 
2018 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2011 
that human identity continues to change even past the age of majority—after a 
period, the risk of prosecuting a now-changed person for a past crime becomes 
too great. 
The criminal justice system needs to take personal identity seriously and 
adopt an informed position. If, as argued below, personal identity evolves over 
time for all of us, then the stakes are very high. We routinely prosecute and 
punish present-day people for crimes that different, past versions of themselves 
committed. Vernon Madison is just one stark example. The courts and attor-
neys in his case focused on whether executing him is cruel and unusual be-
cause he cannot recall his crime.36 Madison should have a stronger due process 
claim.37 The intervening thirty-eight years since the murder,38 his worsening 
vascular dementia,39 and his inability to recall his crime40 constitute new evi-
dence that he is a different person from the man who pulled the trigger.41 Psy-
chological changes (though, if fortunate, not like those that beset Madison) 
affect and accrue for everyone. At some point, everyone should be able to ar-
gue innocence for past crimes. 
This Article has several theses that build to several novel criminal justice 
reforms. The earlier theses are more general and should stand independently of 
those that come later. Part I of this Article draws on psychology and philoso-
phy to argue that personal identity changes over time, and that this should con-
                                                                                                                 
 35 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 202(a) (2019) (“Nearly every American 
jurisdiction has some form of time limitation within which a criminal prosecution must be instituted 
. . . .”). 
 36 U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“[N]or [shall] cruel and unusual punishments [be] inflicted.”); Madi-
son II, 851 F.3d at 1188, 1190 (“We therefore conclude that the state court’s decision that Mr. Madi-
son is competent to be executed rests on an unreasonable determination of the facts. . . . Mr. Madison 
is incompetent to be executed.”); Brief of Petitioner, supra note 13, at 17−29 (arguing that due to his 
illness, the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment bars the state from exe-
cuting Madison); Brief of Respondent, supra note 7, at 27−40 (arguing that the Eighth Amendment 
does not bar the state from executing a murderer who has no memory of his offense). In briefing be-
fore the Supreme Court, Madison newly raised the question of whether his dementia, irrespective of 
its effect on his memory, should bar his execution. See Madison I, 139 S. Ct. at 731 (Alito, J., dissent-
ing) (“After persuading the Court to grant review of [the] question [concerning Madison’s memory 
loss], counsel abruptly changed course.”). 
 37 U.S. CONST. amend XIV (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life . . . without due 
process of law . . . .”). 
 38 Madison v. State, 545 So. 2d 94, 96 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (“[Madison was] convicted of the 
capital offense of the murder of a police officer . . . . [He was] sentenced to death.”). 
 39 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 13, at 5 (“[Madison] now suffers from vascular dementia and 
corresponding long-term severe memory loss, disorientation and impaired cognitive functioning.”). 
 40 Madison II, 851 F.3d at 1177 (“[Madison] has no memory of committing the murder—the very 
act that is the reason for his execution.”). 
 41 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (“[I]f the Constitution renders the fact or timing 
of his execution contingent upon establishment of a further fact, then that fact must be determined 
with the high regard for truth that befits a decision affecting the life or death of a human being.”). 
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cern the criminal law.42 Part I also offers a specific account of the concept of 
personal identity that is relevant to criminal law—that it is tied to and changes 
with moral character.43 Part II argues that this characterological account of per-
sonal identity already has some resonances in criminal law.44 Contrary to the 
received wisdom that “[t]he statute of limitations is clearly a nonexculpatory 
defense,”45 Part II argues that statutes of limitations only make sense as an im-
plicit recognition of the exculpatory impact time can have on identity.46 
Part III discusses several broad-ranging implications for criminal law rec-
ognizing how personal identity changes.47 Though these arguments are framed 
in terms of the characterological account of personal identity in Part II, analo-
gous concerns would arise for any theory according to which identity is not 
static. For example, limitations periods should restrict how long punishment 
may last, not only when prosecution may be initiated; if there is a point after 
which prosecution would violate the identity principle, punishment would also 
violate it after that point. Part III also argues that statutes of limitations should 
differ depending on the age of the culprit, because the rate at which people 
change varies predictably over their lives.48 Finally, this Article concludes by 
reflecting on whether a criminal justice system that broadly takes the limits of 
personal identity seriously is attractive and sustainable. 
The general upshot of the arguments that follow is that there are more in-
nocent people in communities, courts, and prisons than the law currently has 
the conceptual tools to acknowledge. If people change enough to undergo a 
break in whatever interest the criminal law has in their personal identity, a 
guilty person may become an innocent person. These arguments will be of in-
terest to anyone concerned about criminal justice reform. Consider the follow-
ing facts: 
• The United States has the largest prison population and the highest incar-
ceration rate in the world.49 The current trend is upward,50 and has been 
for decades.51 
                                                                                                                 
 42 See infra notes 58−174 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra notes 175−232 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 233−420 and accompanying text. 
 45 ROBINSON, supra note 35, § 202(b). 
 46 See infra notes 361−420 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 421−579 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 424–472 and accompanying text. 
 49 Inst. for Criminal Policy Research & World Prison Brief, Highest to Lowest—Prison Population 
Rate, PRISONSTUDIES.ORG, http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/%20prison-population-
total/trackback?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All [https://perma.cc/JC7S-MRYJ]. 
 50 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Red-
burn eds., 2014) (“After decades of stability from the 1920s to the early 1970s, the rate of incarcera-
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• Average prison terms continue to grow.52 The percentage of inmates who 
are elderly—and who consequently pose very low social threat—grew by 
1300% between 1980 and 2012.53 
• Legislatures across the nation have aggressively extended statutes of limi-
tations for various crimes to reach deeper, often indefinitely, into the 
past.54 
There are many possible explanations behind these figures. Scholars have 
pointed to the war on drugs,55 racially-motivated sentencing policies,56 and a 
shift in the 1970s to a retributive punishment philosophy.57 This Article ex-
pands the list of explanations and adds another arrow to the advocate’s quiver: 
the law has yet to reflect seriously on the nature of personal identity. It conse-
quently punishes people whom it should regard as innocent of the past mis-
conduct currently attributed to them. 
                                                                                                                 
tion in the United States more than quadrupled in the past four decades.”); THE SENTENCING PRO-
JECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS, 1 (2019), https://sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2XV-SG2V] (graphing the 
increasing number of incarcerated people in U.S. state and federal prisons). 
 51 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 50, at 2 (“From 1973 to 2009, the state 
and federal prison populations that are the main focus of this study rose steadily, from about 200,000 
to 1.5 million, declining slightly in the following 4 years.”). 
 52 See Janice Williams, Serving Time: Average Prison Sentence in the U.S. Is Getting Even Long-
er, NEWSWEEK (July 22, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/prison-sentences-increased-2017-jail-
639952 [https://perma.cc/2DV2-2LEU] (stating that the average time prisoners spend incarcerated has 
greatly risen). 
 53 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AT AMERICA’S EXPENSE: THE MASS INCARCERATION OF THE 
ELDERLY, at i (2012), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/elderlyprisonreport_20120613_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M3WQ-QDH5].  
 54 See Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115, 
124–28 (2008) (explaining how legislatures have lengthened and passed exceptions to statutes of 
limitations). 
 55 Lauren Carroll, How the War on Drugs Affected Incarceration Rates, POLITIFACT (July 10, 
2016), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jul/10/cory-booker/how-war-drugs-
affected-incarceration-rates/ [https://perma.cc/YAW6-H74Z] (examining Senator Cory Booker’s 
claim that the war on drugs led to “a 500 percent increase in incarceration” and finding that “state and 
federal prison population[s] remained fairly stable through the early 1970s, until the war on drugs 
began. Since then, it has increased sharply every year.”). 
 56 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 50, at 3 (“Mandatory prison sentences, 
intensified enforcement of drug laws, and long sentences contributed not only to overall high rates of 
incarceration, but also especially to extraordinary rates of incarceration in black and Latino communi-
ties.”). 
 57 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on 
the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11−14 (2003) (explaining 
how penology changed following the 1960s with greater emphasis on increased punishments). 
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I. THE PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF DIACHRONIC  
CRIMINAL IDENTITY 
Only a thin thread of legal scholarship over the last three decades ex-
plores the potential significance of personal identity for criminal law. Some 
scholars cut the discussion short by citing what they take to be criminal law’s 
disinterest in the matter.58 Others have done meaningful work on identity, but 
the reach of their work is limited by two factors. First, they consider identity 
change only in very limited contexts: futuristic capabilities,59 extreme cases of 
mental illness,60 dramatic instances of identity breakdown,61 late stage demen-
tia,62 and “severe permanent disabilities.”63 As a result, these scholars tend to 
think that the circumstances in which personal identity could be relevant to 
criminal law are “narrow” or “quite rare,”64 as where “a person . . . commits an 
offense, gets in an accident, suffers amnesia, totally changes from a bad to a 
good person, and does not get caught for decades.”65 Second, the discussions 
tend to be anecdotal, philosophical, and hypothetical.66 Untethered from psy-
chological facts that underlie identity formation and change, previous scholar-
ship lacks the perspective to make concrete policy proposals. Instead, past pro-
posals have tended to be quite conservative by justifying present doctrine 
against challenges from personal identity, rather than embracing reform.67 
This Article aims to show that personal identity should be a ubiquitous 
concern for criminal law, even in the absence of illness, tragedy, and science 
                                                                                                                 
 58 See, e.g., Flanders, supra note 16, at 465 (discussing how the criminal justice system is content 
in discounting identity changes). 
 59 See, e.g., O. Carter Snead, Memory and Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1243 (2011) 
(focusing on “the speculative and projected application of memory modification techniques for 
healthy individuals”). 
 60 See, e.g., Elyn R. Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, 25 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 383, 388−89 (1992) (focusing on people who suffer from multiple personality disor-
der). 
 61 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Patty Hearst Reconsidered: Personal Identity in the Criminal 
Law, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 367, 372, 382, 385 (2018) (discussing “brainwashing,” “narrow” cases 
where a person has no identity at all, and “profound break[s] in identity” like sleepwalking). 
 62 Annette Dufner, Should the Late Stage Demented Be Punished for Past Crimes?, 7 CRIM. L. & 
PHIL. 137, 149 (2013). 
 63 See Sean Hannon Williams, Self-Altering Injury: The Hidden Harms of Hedonic Adaptation, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 535, 538, 556 (2011) (discussing tort victims whose injuries lead to a loss of identi-
ty). 
 64 Ferzan, supra note 61, at 382, 388. 
 65 Id. at 388. 
 66 One notable exception is Snead, supra note 59. Its detailed treatment of the psychology and 
neuroscience of memory is the standard to which this present Article aspires. 
 67 See generally Rebecca Dresser, Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REV. 395, 445 
(1990) (concluding that because most people maintain their psychological connections to their past 
crimes, deterrence and incapacitation are justified). 
2022 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2011 
fiction. To that end, this Part characterizes the relevant notion of personal iden-
tity and why it should interest the criminal law.68 Section A presents the most 
plausible and widely accepted philosophical framework for personal identity—
namely that it tracks psychological connections between present people and 
their past selves.69 Section B turns to recent work in psychology that adds fur-
ther detail to the framework discussed in Section A.70 It focuses on data sup-
porting the theory that personal identity is subject to a gradual yet constant 
process of evolution and change. Section C then adapts the theory to the crimi-
nal context.71 It proposes that personal identity, for purposes of criminal law, 
should track characterological dispositions toward criminality. When those 
dispositions decrease sufficiently over time, the law should treat past criminals, 
for all intents and purposes, as new people, immune to prosecution or punish-
ment. 
A. The Philosophy 
Criminal law applies to people.72 As such, the jurisdiction of the criminal 
law must be circumscribed by its views on what people are, and where/when 
people start/end. Federal law defines “person” to include “individuals;”73 but 
that simple substitution of terms masks a wide range of conflicting views about 
what makes up an individual and what makes an individual who she is. If crim-
inal law is to have a truly studied view, it must turn to the subject matter that 
philosophers call “personal identity.”74 
There are really two issues of personal identity.75 The first is the matter of 
“synchronic identity,” which asks what makes up a person at any given single 
moment in time.76 
                                                                                                                 
 68 I have previously written about personal identity for corporate criminals and will draw on cor-
porate analogies to make the individual case more intuitive. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate 
Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049, 2050−51 (2016) (arguing that respondeat superior is 
both over- and under-inclusive). 
 69 See infra notes 72−132 and accompanying text. 
 70 See infra notes 133−172 and accompanying text. 
 71 See infra notes 173−232 and accompanying text. 
 72 See MODEL PENAL CODE I § 2.01 (specifying the “General Principles of Liability” in terms of 
conditions that a “person” might satisfy). 
 73 Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 74 See generally Eric T. Olson, Personal Identity, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ [https://perma.cc/
YV9A-9G8Q] (explaining that personal identity addresses the “philosophical questions that arise 
about ourselves by virtue of our being people”); Derek Parfit, Personal Identity, 80 PHIL. REV. 3, 3−4 
(1971) (introducing the concept of “personal identity”). 
 75 Actually, there are many more than two. See Olson, supra note 74, § 1 (stating that there are a 
number of issues regarding personal identity). For purposes of zeroing in on the issue of personal 
identity at issue here, distinguishing the two that follow is sufficient. 
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Synchronic Identity: The identity relation that holds between a thing 
and itself in a single reference time. 
A theory of synchronic identity should specify which things in the world are 
parts of a person (brain, hands, feet, nose, et cetera) and how they must relate 
to each other (attached as normal, rather than strewn about the room) to consti-
tute her.77 Two things that have all those same parts in the same arrangement at 
the same time are synchronically identical to each other. 
Having a view on synchronic identity is important to criminal law. One 
basic purpose of a trial is to confirm questions of synchronic identity. To illus-
trate: “There was a man in a mask who shot the victim; the evidence shows 
that man was Joe!” Synchronic identity is also important to criminal theory—
by specifying where the person ends and the rest of the world begins, it sets 
conditions on what a person can be responsible for. The law must distinguish 
which causal forces proceed from the defendant (for example, volitional acts)78 
and those that do not (for example, intervening acts of others, psychotic epi-
sodes, epileptic seizures, remote and unforeseeable turns of events).79 The law 
generally only punishes people for the former.80 To do so, it must be able to 
say what the defendant is. Historically, there has been relatively little contro-
versy in criminal law about what makes up individual people. People are 
roughly defined by reference to a biological understanding of what constitutes 
and individuates living members of the species Homo sapiens.81 
                                                                                                                 
 76 Andre Gallois, Identity Over Time, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 
30, § 1, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/ [https://perma.cc/H52F-ZMM7] (“By syn-
chronic identity we mean an identity holding at a single time.”). 
 77 Harold Noonan & Ben Curtis, Identity, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, § 4 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/ [https://perma.cc/U4RA-
CBUL] (“A criterion of synchronic identity, by contrast, will typically specify how the parts of an F-
thing existing at a time must be related, or how one F at a time is marked off from another.”). 
 78 See MODEL PENAL CODE I § 2.01(1) (“A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is 
based on conduct that includes a voluntary act . . . .”). 
 79 See id. § 2.01(2) (“The following are not voluntary acts . . . (a) a reflex or convulsion; (b) a 
bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep; (c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from 
hypnotic suggestion; (d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determina-
tion of the actor.”). See generally Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons, Causes, 60 J. PHIL. 685, 
685−86 (1963) (explaining that not all actions have a rational explanation behind them); Harry G. 
Frankfurt, The Problem of Action, 15 AM. PHIL. Q. 157, 157 (1978) (stating that the “causal approach” 
does little to explain the “nature of action”); Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept 
of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 6 (1971) (declaring that one of the most important features separating hu-
mans from other species is their will). 
 80 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.2(c) (2d ed. 1986) (indicating 
that “liability requires that the activity in question be voluntary”). 
 81 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735–36 (8th Cir. 2008) (find-
ing the statutory definition of a living human being as “an individual living member of the species of 
Homo sapiens” was clear) (internal quotations omitted); see MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(1) (AM. 
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It may be easier to conceptualize the importance of synchronic identity 
when it comes to a different kind of person—the corporation.82 There are two 
prominent controversies about synchronic corporate identity. First, scholars 
disagree about what the constituent parts of corporations are. According to tra-
ditional views, the constituents of a corporation are its shareholders, directors, 
managers, and employees.83 Newer “stakeholder” views would—at least for 
some purposes—expand the corporate constituency to include customers, sup-
pliers, and creditors.84 After settling what the constituent parts are, a second 
question of corporate synchronic identity arises—when are they constituent 
parts? Employees, for example, are people in their own right. Sometimes they 
act as parts of corporations, and sometimes they act solely on their own ac-
count, taking a “frolic of [their] own.”85 Under the ultra vires doctrine, the law 
once held that employees are not parts of their corporate employer anytime 
they do something not authorized in the corporate charter.86 Over a century 
ago, criminal courts adopted the modern line between corporate identity and 
                                                                                                                 
LAW INST. 1980) (“‘[H]uman being’ means a person who has been born and is alive . . . .”) [hereinaf-
ter MODEL PENAL CODE II]. 
 82 1 U.S.C. § 1 (defining “person” to include “corporations”). 
 83 Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency Con-
cerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1096 (2000) (“The modern trend in state law is to view the corporation as 
a ‘nexus of contracts’ involving various constituents, including shareholders, directors, managers, and 
employees.”). 
 84 Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Cor-
porate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 676 (2006) (“A long-running debate exists in corporate law be-
tween those who believe the corporation’s sole or primary purpose is to maximize shareholder profit, 
the ‘shareholder primacy’ theory, and those who believe a corporation must honor all of its constitu-
ents’ interests, including the concerns of employees, creditors, customers, and society at large, the 
‘stakeholder’ theory.”). No one has argued, as far as I know, that corporations can act through these 
constituent groups that stakeholder theorists would include. For example, a car rental company is not 
responsible for reckless driving by its customers. John P. Ludington, State Regulation of Motor Vehi-
cle Rental (“You Drive”) Business, 60 A.L.R. 4th 784, § 50 (1988). 
 85 Dowd v. Webb, 337 F.2d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 1964) (“The sum of the Rhode Island decisional law 
is that where a wilful [sic] tort of a servant is not merely a ‘frolic of his own’ but occurs in relation to 
his master’s business, then the master will be responsible for his wilful [sic] assault upon another if 
there is an express authorization to use force, or if it can be implied.”). 
 86 JOHN W. SALMOND, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE ENGLISH LAW OF LIABILITY 
FOR CIVIL INJURIES 58 (3d ed. 1912); Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of 
Organizational ‘Real Entity’ Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 594−95 (1989); Dale Rubin, Corporate 
Personhood: How the Courts Have Employed Bogus Jurisprudence to Grant Corporations Constitu-
tional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523, 540−42 (2010). Over time, how-
ever, the courts found the ultra vires doctrine less persuasive regarding corporate tort liability. See, 
e.g., Phila., Wilmington, & Balt. R.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202, 209−10 (1858) (holding 
that a corporation is responsible for its agent’s conduct if such conduct was performed in the ordinary 
course of business and for the corporation); Nims v. Mt. Hermon Boys’ Sch., 35 N.E. 776, 777 (Mass. 
1893) (stating that it is no shield from liability for a corporation to argue that its corporate charter does 
not authorize tortious conduct).  
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employee identity87 using respondeat superior.88 According to that doctrine, 
employees act as parts of a corporation only when working within the scope of 
their employment and intending to benefit the corporation.89 Controversy re-
mains about whether respondeat superior correctly defines corporate syn-
chronic identity—whether as a matter of metaphysics90 or of sound policy.91 
This Article focuses on a different question of personal identity: “dia-
chronic identity.” While synchronic identity refers to what a person is at a sin-
gle moment, diachronic identity looks across time.92 
Diachronic Identity: If T1 and T2 are two different times, and A ex-
ists at T1, and B exists at T2, then A is diachronically identical to B if 
and only if they are the same thing (albeit at different times). 
Synchronic identity draws a line around something, separating it from the 
world, whereas diachronic identity draws a line between past and present, de-
scribing when something starts, when it ends, and when it changes so much 
that it becomes something new. One famous illustration of the difficulties of 
diachronic identity is the ship of the ancient Greek hero, Theseus.93 At the end 
of every adventure, Theseus’s crew inspected the ship and replaced worn 
parts.94 After many years, not a single part of the original ship remained; eve-
rything had been replaced.95 Was it still the same ship despite having none of 
its original parts? If different, at which point did it change? 
Diachronic identity of people is, like synchronic identity, an essential 
concern for criminal justice.96 Punishment always comes sometime after a 
                                                                                                                 
 87 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493−94 (1909). 
 88 See, e.g., The “Scotland,” 105 U.S. 24, 30−31 (1882) (declaring that respondeat superior per-
tains to the corporations); Phila. & Reading R.R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 468, 486−87 (1853) 
(describing respondeat superior); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) 
(defining respondeat superior).  
 89 JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 157 (6th ed., 
2016) (indicating that corporations are only liable for their agents’ acts while the agents are acting in 
the scope of actual or apparent authority and with some purpose to benefit the corporation). 
 90 John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liabil-
ity, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1345 (2009). 
 91 Diamantis, supra note 68, at 2057−58 (arguing that respondeat superior has little effect in 
criminal law due to the modern corporate setting of diminished employee responsibility). 
 92 Gallois, supra note 76, § 1 (“By diachronic identity we mean an identity holding between 
something existing at one time and something existing at another.”). 
 93 PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS 8 (R. M. Hutchins ed., 1952). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See Peter A. French, Complicity: That Moral Monster, Troubling Matters, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 
575, 579 (2016) (“Usually the crucial question for diachronic responsibility is whether the agent 
whose responsibility for A at t2 (or at any t1 + n) is to be assessed as the same agent who was syn-
chronically responsible for A at t1.”). 
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crime is committed97 (though science fiction writers98 and theorists99 imagine 
different possibilities). This means that there will always be a temporal gap 
between the two events. According to the identity principle,100 the state must 
ensure that the present-day person it sanctions is the same as the past person 
who committed the crime.101 This is a question of diachronic identity. As ex-
plained below, there are compelling philosophical and psychological reasons to 
think that personal identity is not stable, especially over long periods of time. 
To get a sense of the issue and the stakes, consider again an analogy to the 
corporate person. Corporations can change in many more ways than natural 
people: they can merge with other corporations, spin off divisions, change 
headquarters, and gain and lose shareholders/directors/managers.102 Suppose, 
for example, Corporation A commits an as-yet-undiscovered crime and then 
merges with Corporation B. Upon uncovering the crime, the law must say 
whether the composite corporation is identical to A, and hence liable for its 
crimes, or identical to B, and hence not liable.103 Corporate law uses the doc-
trine of successor liability to answer the question of diachronic corporate iden-
tity. A corporation could change every one of its shareholders104 or its employ-
ees105 and remain the same corporation so far as corporate criminal law is con-
cerned. In the case of a merger, the law considers the resulting corporation to 
                                                                                                                 
 97 John J. DiIulio, Jr., Help Wanted: Economists, Crime and Public Policy, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 
16−17 (1996) (discussing some young men’s difficulty in delaying present gratification to avoid pun-
ishment for their wrongs); John S. Strahorn, Jr., Criminology and the Law of Guilt, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 
491, 491−97 (1936) (explaining the commonalities between the theories of punishment, including 
guilt following some act worthy of punishment). 
 98 See Anthony Lane, WhoWillHaveDunit, NEW YORKER (June 23, 2002), https://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2002/07/01/whowillhavedunit [https://perma.cc/98EU-P5TG] (reviewing the 
film Minority Report, which was adapted from a short story that depicts a futuristic world where the 
state can predict a murder before it happens and punish those for their intent to murder).  
 99 See, e.g., Gabriel S. Mendlow, Why Is It Wrong to Punish Thought?, 127 YALE L.J. 2342, 2345 
(2018) (stating that criminal thoughts are as precarious as criminal action and justify punishment). 
 100 See supra notes 72−99 and accompanying text. 
 101 See infra notes 173−232 and accompanying text. 
 102 See generally Mihailis E. Diamantis, Successor Identity, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4 (2019) (dis-
cussing the various ways corporations can change their identities). 
 103 ELLEN S. PODGOR ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME 42 (2d ed. 2018) (“Whether via dissolution, 
bankruptcy, mergers, or sales, the original corporation may no longer be present and it may be neces-
sary to determine whether the criminal matter can proceed.”). 
 104 Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 415 (1932) (“A corporation and its stockholders are generally 
to be treated as separate entities.”); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 804 (2019) (“A change in ownership and 
control of a corporate defendant does not preclude corporate criminal liability for offenses committed 
prior to that change.”). 
 105 Respondeat superior makes no exception for former employees. See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi et 
al., 6 Volkswagen Executives Charged as Company Pleads Guilty in Emissions Case, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/business/volkswagen-diesel-vw-settlement-
charges-criminal.html [https://perma.cc/R4MQ-5TFQ] (explaining that Volkswagen was prosecuted 
based on acts of former officers). 
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be identical to both A and B—and hence liable for the past acts of both.106 Re-
fusing to acknowledge the possibility for a break in corporate identity is not 
only metaphysically unsound,107 but also has bad consequences. Successor 
liability thwarts criminal justice (by sanctioning unsuspecting shareholders for 
other corporations’ misconduct)108 and undermines basic policy objectives, 
such as encouraging corporations to self-report.109  
Criminal law undermines its own objectives by paying insufficient atten-
tion to diachronic identity for natural people. Philosophers offer two main per-
spectives.110 One perspective subscribes to: 
Bodily Continuity: Two people at different times are the same per-
son if they have the same body.111  
This class of views captures some intuitive judgments about personal identi-
ty.112 It explains, for example, the intuition that everyone was once a fetus and 
may someday become elderly. Criminal law often seems to assume a bodily 
continuity view. The trial process concludes that if a present-day person has 
                                                                                                                 
 106 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259 (2011 & Supp. 2018) (“[A]ll rights of creditors and . . . 
liabilities and duties of the respective constituent corporations shall thenceforth attach to said surviv-
ing or resulting corporation, and may be enforced against it to the same extent as if said debts, liabili-
ties and duties had been incurred or contracted by it.”); United States v. Alamo Bank of Tex., 880 
F.2d 828, 830 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that a corporation “cannot escape punishment by merging with 
[another corporation] and taking [its] corporate persona”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.07(4) (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2016) (“[A]ll debts, obligations and other liabilities of each domestic or foreign corpora-
tion or eligible entity that is a party to the merger, other than the survivor, are debts, obligations or 
liabilities of the survivor . . . .”). 
 107 See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Essence and Identity in Criminal Law, 154 J. BUS. ETH-
ICS 955, 964−65 (2018) (arguing that a newly merged or spun-off corporation from a criminal corpo-
ration should be held criminally responsible, despite a corporate entity change, if its essential criminal 
identity persists).  
 108 Diamantis, supra note 102, at 19−20. 
 109 Id. at 18−19. 
 110 22 PERSONAL IDENTITY, at vii–viii (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2005). There is actually a 
third class of views—soul-based approaches—that say that a person is eternally identical to their im-
material and indestructible soul. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 26 (stating that personal identity re-
quires consciousness); Reid, supra note 26, at 264 (“My personal identity, therefore, implies the con-
tinued existence of that indivisible thing which I call myself.”). Because these have fallen out of favor 
in contemporary philosophy, I do not discuss them here.  
 111 See, e.g., ERIC T. OLSON, THE HUMAN ANIMAL: PERSONAL IDENTITY WITHOUT PSYCHOLO-
GY 16 (1997) (“I would put biology in place of psychology, and one’s biological life in place of one’s 
mind, in determining what it takes for us to persist: a biological approach to personal identity.”); Ju-
dith Jarvis Thomson, People and Their Bodies, in READING PARFIT  202, 202 (Johnathan Dancy ed., 
1997) (“The simplest view of what people are is that they are their bodies.”); B.A.O. Williams, Per-
sonal Identity and Individuation, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 229, 230 (1957) (“[B]odily identity 
is always a necessary condition of personal identity.”).  
 112 See OLSON, supra note 111, at 11–21 (arguing throughout that personal identity rests in the 
biological organism). 
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the same fingerprints, DNA, and face as a past person, she must be that per-
son.113 Congress and many states have passed statutes allowing prosecutors to 
file so-called “John Doe indictments,” which identify an otherwise unknown 
defendant solely by her DNA profile.114 When authorities eventually (perhaps 
decades later) find the person with matching DNA, that person is substituted 
by name into the indictment.115 This approach only makes sense if diachronic 
identity tracks bodily continuity. 
Bodily continuity may provide a serviceable heuristic for diachronic iden-
tity over short time periods. Its day-to-day utility may explain why it seems 
intuitive. For example, if someone visits the laundromat to pick up her dry 
cleaning, she readily assumes that the person who looks like the person she 
handed her dry-cleaning to the day before is that same person. A person’s body 
helps us pick her out of the crowd, and the probability that an identity-altering 
change occurred within any twenty-four hour period is very small. 
Considering cases that reach beyond day-to-day life, however, can put se-
rious strain on the intuitive plausibility of bodily-continuity views. As criminal 
law recognizes, after a person dies, her body remains, but the person does 
not.116 Death tends to exempt one from prosecution. Cases of dissociative iden-
tity disorder present another challenge: two or more people, distinct from each 
other, inhabit the same body.117 Again, criminal law recognizes this. Some 
courts will not convict a defendant with dissociative identity disorder if the 
personality in control at the time of the crime differs from the one in control at 
the time of trial.118 
                                                                                                                 
 113 Joseph Peterson et al., The Role and Impact of Forensic Evidence in the Criminal Justice Pro-
cess, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., 11−12 (2010) https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231977.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AH23-VQFA] (extensively studying the role forensic evidence plays in criminal 
trials). 
 114 Scott Akehurst-Moore, An Appropriate Balance? A Survey and Critique of State and Federal 
DNA Indictment and Tolling Statutes, 6 J. HIGH TECH. L. 213, 242−47 (2006); see, e.g., Prosecutorial 
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 3282 
(2012) (allowing an indictment of an individual whose identity is unknown but who has a DNA pro-
file); Justice for All Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3297 (2012) (“In a case in which DNA . . . implicates an 
identified person in the commission of a felony, no statute of limitations . . . shall preclude such pros-
ecution until a period of time following the implication of the person by DNA testing has elapsed that 
is equal to the otherwise applicable limitation period.”). 
 115 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dixon, 938 N.E.2d 878, 883 (Mass. 2010) (stating that the suspect 
was indicted with his DNA profile acting as a “placeholder” until an identity was found).  
 116 Some philosophers dispute this claim. See, e.g., David Mackie, Personal Identity and Dead 
People, 95 PHIL. STUD.: INT’L J. PHIL. ANALYTIC TRADITION 219, 219 (1999) (“I am not the first to 
claim that people can continue to exist, as corpses, after their deaths.”). 
 117 Saks, supra note 60, at 408 (arguing that those suffering from multiple personality disorder 
“seem to consist of different people”). 
 118 See, e.g., United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1016–17 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that 
there was enough evidence to show the defendant suffered from multiple personality disorder and, as a 
result, did not meet the necessary mens rea of the statute); Parker v. State, 597 S.W.2d 586, 587, 589 
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The most persuasive critique of bodily continuity views may come from 
intuition-pumping narratives like the Netflix series “Altered Carbon.” In the 
show, people’s psychological traits are loaded in digital format on small disks 
called “stacks,” which can be removed from their “sleeves” (i.e. bodies) and 
inserted into new ones.119 Seamlessly, the audience tracks characters even as 
they move from one body to the next, changing age and sex.120 Science fiction 
writers121 and philosophers122 have long drawn on similar themes of digitized 
consciousness or brain-swapping experiments. Under the strain of such argu-
ments, philosophers today generally disfavor bodily continuity views.123 
                                                                                                                 
(Ark. 1980) (affirming the defendant’s conviction because the trial judge properly found that the de-
fendant failed to prove her defense that she was legally insane because it was her other personality 
that committed the crime); see also IAN HACKING, REWRITING THE SOUL: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY 
AND THE SCIENCES OF MEMORY 48–50 (1995) (wondering to what extent multiples should be crimi-
nally responsible); JENNIFER RADDEN, DIVIDED MINDS AND SUCCESSIVE SELVES: ETHICAL ISSUES IN 
DISORDERS OF IDENTITY AND PERSONALITY 140–42 (1996) (discussing whether it is fair to hold a 
multiple who did not participate in the crime liable); Stephen E. Braude, Multiple Personality and 
Moral Responsibility, 3 PHIL., PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 37, 48 (1996) (pointing out that courts must 
consider the issue of when a person with multiple personality disorder should be held criminally liable 
for the persuasions of their alternative personalities); Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Stephen Behnke, 
Criminal Law and Multiple Personality Disorder: The Vexing Problems of Personhood and Respon-
sibility, 10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 277, 279 (2001) (stating that depending on which personality is 
dominant at the time of the crime helps determine whether a person should be held criminally respon-
sible); Kathleen V. Wilkes, Multiple Personality and Personal Identity, 32 BRITISH J. PHIL. SCI. 331, 
344 (1981) (“Applying these considerations to [a person with multiple personality disorder], we see 
that the various personalities were not counted as persons at all . . . despite the fact that each could be 
blamed or praised for her own activities but not for those of the others.”).  
 119 Altered Carbon: Out of the Past, NETFLIX.COM, https://www.netflix.com/watch/80097140?
tctx=1%2C0%2C%2C%2C [https://perma.cc/6DE2-Y4G5]. 
 120 Id. 
 121 See, e.g., Anthony Lane, “Ghost in the Shell” and “Graduation,” NEW YORKER (Mar. 31, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/10/ghost-in-the-shell-and-graduation-reviews 
[https://perma.cc/3K9E-BDUH] (describing the movie Ghost in the Shell, which features a future 
world in which consciousness has been digitized). 
 122 See, e.g., Locke, supra note 12, at 41 (posing the question of whether a person has the same 
identity after a total change in physical composition); Peter Unger, Survival of the Sentient, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 325, 328 (James Tomberlin ed., 2000) (describing brain-swapping scenari-
os); Bernard Williams, The Self and the Future, 79 PHIL. REV. 161, 161 (1970) (presenting an imag-
ined plot of two people switching bodies). 
 123 For present-day criminal law, bodily continuity may remain relevant to, but not determinative 
of personal identity. In the real world, where people’s brains tend to stay in their heads and conscious-
ness remains biologically encoded, bodily continuity may still serve as a necessary condition for per-
sonal identity—if two people do not have the same body, then they must be different people. Under 
this approach, a DNA match between a defendant and a past criminal cannot be dispositive of guilt, 
but a DNA mismatch would be dispositive of innocence. See THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.
innocenceproject.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/2MNQ-JXUA] (“The Innocence Project . . . exonerates 
the wrongly convicted through DNA testing and reforms the criminal justice system to prevent future 
injustice.”). 
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Philosophers of diachronic personal identity124 prefer to look for a psycho-
logical relationship between past and present selves.125 By focusing on psychol-
ogy, these views can explain why death terminates identity (psychology ceases), 
how multiple personalities can inhabit one body (the alternate personalities are 
psychologically discrete), and why intuitions about identity follow “stacks” ra-
ther than “sleeves.” Identity theorists who focus on psychological relationships 
differ regarding which psychological traits and relationships they think are rele-
vant for establishing diachronic identity. For example, one traditional approach, 
commonly traced to John Locke, looks to memory—an earlier person is identical 
to a later person if the latter can remember having been the former.126 
Psychological approaches to diachronic personal identity, however, also 
face possible pathologies. Focusing on memory as an identity-making connec-
tion, one famous objection points out that the view can lead to transitivity fail-
ures that violate the logical structure of the identity relationship.127 For exam-
ple, suppose that a teen, T, remembers being a child, C. Suppose further that 
adult, A, remembers being T, but cannot remember anything about her child-
hood. According to the memory criterion, A is the same person as T, T is the 
same person as C, but (impossibly) A is not the same person as C. 
There are different strategies to solving such transitivity failures. The 
most prominent approach is to distinguish between two different ways psycho-
logical traits might tie together temporal parts of the same person.128 One is: 
Psychological Connectedness: An earlier person is psychologically 
connected to a later person if the latter has her psychological state 
largely because of the psychological state the former was in.129  
Connectedness is like the relationship between adjacent links in a steel chain. 
In the above example, T is psychologically connected (by memory) to C be-
cause T’s memories are due to C’s experiences. For the same reason, A is psy-
chologically connected (by memory) to T. A and C, however, are not psycho-
logically connected (none of A’s memories are due to C’s experiences). It 
should be noted that because psychological connectedness is not a transitive 
                                                                                                                 
 124 Olson, supra note 74, § 3 (“The most popular [approaches among philosophers when answer-
ing questions about personal identity] are psychological-continuity views.”). 
 125 See, e.g., Parfit, supra note 74, at 14–18 (discussing the role of memory in personal identity); 
Sydney Shoemaker, Persons and Their Pasts, 7 AM. PHIL. Q. 269, 284 (1970) (stating that a person’s 
memory is vital in assessing self-identity). 
 126 David P. Behan, Locke on Persons and Personal Identity, 9 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 53, 55 (1979). 
 127 John Perry, The Problem of Personal Identity, in PERSONAL IDENTITY, supra note 12, at 10–
12.  
 128 Sydney Shoemaker, Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account, in PERSONAL IDENTITY 67, 
77–79 (Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne eds., 1984). 
 129 DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 204–05 (1984). 
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relationship, it cannot, strictly speaking, be a criterion of formal identity. Nev-
ertheless, it may still be what we really care about when we, albeit confusedly, 
ask whether two people at different times are the “same.” 
The second relevant psychological relationship that philosophers distin-
guish is: 
Psychological Continuity: An earlier person is psychologically con-
tinuous with a later person if a chain of psychologically connected 
people links them together.130 
Continuity is like the relationship that all links in a single steel chain have to 
each other. In the above example, C, T, and A are all psychologically continu-
ous with each other. A and C are psychologically continuous because they are 
linked by connections to T. If a senior citizen S can recall being A but not be-
ing T or C, S would nonetheless be psychologically continuous with all three 
prior states. 
The distinction between continuity and connectedness may help resolve 
transitivity failures. This is because “personal identity” may refer ambiguously 
to either psychological connectedness or psychological continuity depending 
on the context. Only continuity is a transitive relationship; connectedness is 
not. The traditional formulation of the memory criterion runs into transitivity 
failures because it conceives of identity solely in terms of connectedness, 
which is not a transitive relationship. 
Assuming psychological accounts of diachronic identity are preferable, 
the relative roles of connectedness and continuity remain debatable. So far as 
holding present-day people responsible for past acts is concerned—as the 
criminal law does when it convicts and punishes—most theorists seem to ac-
cept that psychological connectedness is the more important relationship.131 
Where the framing question is whether a present-day person is identical to a 
past criminal, transitivity failures are not a concern—there are only two rele-
vant time frames, and three are needed for a transitivity failure. 
There are strong intuitions backing the relative importance of connected-
ness for responsibility attribution. Imagine that a person commits a crime and 
then mentally degenerates over several years—forgetting memories, losing 
independent desires, shedding any idiosyncratic personality traits—until she 
becomes a borderline case of a person. The present person and the past crimi-
nal are fully continuous, but very loosely connected, if connected at all. De-
spite full continuity, the strong intuition is that punishing the present-day per-
                                                                                                                 
 130 Id. at 204–06.  
 131 Id. at 326 (“When some convict is now less closely connected to himself at the time of his 
crime, he deserved less punishment. If the connections are very weak, he may deserve none.”). 
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son would be inappropriate. One might reply that the better explanation of this 
intuition is that the present-day person is not competent to be punished. Now 
imagine, however, that a doctor administers a medicine to the person so that 
she regains competence, but does not regain her former psychology—she 
forms memories, aspirations, and personality anew. The newly-competent per-
son would still be fully continuous with the former criminal, but the strong 
intuition remains that punishment for the past crime would be inappropriate.132 
Accordingly, the remainder of this Article assumes that some type of psy-
chological connectedness is the relevant criterion for diachronic personal iden-
tity in criminal law. 
B. The Psychology 
One danger of purely philosophical methods is that they can lose their 
grounding in reality. Recent empirical data, however, confirms that people’s 
ordinary intuitions support the philosophical view that diachronic identity is 
about psychological connections.133 For example, in one recent study, partici-
pants were asked about two versions of a scenario in which “Jim” underwent a 
procedure to transplant his brain into a new body.134 In one version of the sce-
nario, Jim’s memories were preserved and in another they were erased during 
the transplant.135 Subjects were asked whether the patient who woke up was 
“still Jim,” and reported in the first version that he was, despite changing bod-
                                                                                                                 
 132 Annette Dufner offers another compelling illustration: 
Imagine we are trying to determine the extent to which the punishment of two different 
dementia patients in the earlier stages of the disease is justified. The first patient has 
clear recollections of having plotted and committed the crime, but there is a brief time 
period in between the crime and the present for which the patient is already drawing a 
complete blank. The second patient also remembers the crime, and there is no period of 
amnesia in between the crime and the present time. The first case differs from the sec-
ond in an important respect. In the first case, there is a direct connection to the crime, 
but no continuity between the present and the time of the crime. Continuity is a transi-
tive notion. If there is a period in someone’s past that the patient does not even in prin-
ciple have the capacity to remember anymore, then there is no transitive chain, and 
therefore no continuity anymore. 
Dufner, supra note 62, at 149. 
 133 Shaun Nichols & Michael Bruno, Intuitions About Personal Identity: An Empirical Study, 23 
PHIL. PSYCHOL. 293, 307 (2010) (“Over the course of our experiments, we found that intuitions favor-
ing a psychological approach to personal identity are resilient across significant changes in the cases. 
Those intuitions also converge with the judgments people make when simply asked an abstract ques-
tion about what is required for persistence.”). 
 134 Sergey Blok et al., Individuals and Their Concepts, in CATEGORIZATION INSIDE AND OUTSIDE 
THE LABORATORY 127, 133 (Woo-kyoung Ahn et al. eds., 2005). 
 135 Id. at 133–34.  
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ies.136 Subsequent studies confirm this result for similar scenarios presented 
from a first-personal (rather than third-personal) perspective.137 Researchers 
also asked participants, in the abstract, what matters for personal identity.138 
The responses show that connected psychological states such as memory, per-
sonality traits, beliefs, and values can all play a role.139 
If diachronic personal identity is a matter of psychological connectedness, 
then available data confirms the first major thesis of this Article: Everyone’s 
personal identity changes over time.140 All psychological connections between 
future and past selves dissipate with time. Casual observation is confirmation 
enough that some psychological states—such as desires, intentions, and ambi-
tions—are inherently unstable. These states form, persist, and expire after they 
are satisfied. Other mental states, like memories, are more durable by nature. 
Still, they have a half-life. People lose memories all the time, and the older the 
memory, the more likely it is to go unremembered.141 All things being equal, 
people remember more about yesterday than about a day a month ago, and 
more about a day last month than a day last decade. People also form new 
memories daily—short, medium, and long term—as they have new experienc-
es and learn new things. Because these mental states, despite lasting for some 
period, are nonetheless in constant flux, whatever psychological connection 
they provide between past and present selves must grow more attenuated with 
time. This is not to deny that some of these mental states may last a lifetime. 
Someone may always long for her childhood home or recall her father’s em-
brace. Still, the total number of these psychological connections diminishes 
over time. 
Even connections among more stable psychological features—like char-
acterological traits and the personalities, values, and preferences that underlie 
them—continuously evolve throughout life.142 The study introduced at the start 
                                                                                                                 
 136 Id. at 134–35.  
 137 Nichols & Bruno, supra note 133, at 299–300. 
 138 Id. at 304. 
 139 Id.; see also Richard M. Gale, A Note on Personal Identity and Bodily Continuity, 29 ANALY-
SIS 193, 194 (1969) (“It seems to me that our ordinary concept of personal identity is not founded 
upon any logical one-one relation, but upon a number of non-logical one-one relations, such as being 
bodily continuous with, having the same ostensible memories (personality, character, abilities, skills, 
physical appearance, etc.) as. No one of these relations is either necessary or sufficient, but satisfac-
tion of several of them is necessary and sufficient for personal identity.”). 
 140 See supra notes 133–139 and accompanying text. 
 141 Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications of Memory 
Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1604 (2006) (“Memories have a natural rate of decay . . . .”). 
 142 See Daniel K. Mroczek & Christian M. Kolarz, The Effect of Age on Positive and Negative 
Aspect: A Developmental Perspective on Happiness, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1333, 
1333 (1998) (explaining that personality traits must be considered to fully assess the relationship be-
tween age and happiness); Kimberly M. Prenda & Margie E. Lachman, Planning for the Future: A 
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of this Article asked thousands of participants, aged twenty-eight to sixty-
eight, to report how much they had changed in the previous ten years.143 There 
were three questions, one each about personality, values, and preferences.144 
All age groups reported for all three questions that they had changed.145 Alt-
hough the magnitude of the reported change decreased for older age groups, it 
never reached zero.146 The researchers verified that the personal changes par-
ticipants reported were not a product of faulty memory.147 To measure this, the 
researchers compared their results to a large preexisting database (the MacAr-
thur Foundation Survey of Midlife Development in the United States)148 of 
personality test responses that people had filled out at ten-year intervals.149 The 
two sets of results matched.150 Numerous other studies demonstrate other pre-
dictable psychological developments that naturally occur as people age, such 
as changing levels of emotional regulation151 or changing positive/negative 
affect.152 
Not all psychological connections matter equally for identity. Social psy-
chologists working in this area build on previous results in cognitive science 
about identity more generally.153 One early discovery was that people naturally 
distinguish between “accidental” and “essential” traits, where only changes to 
                                                                                                                 
Life Management Strategy for Increasing Control and Life Satisfaction in Adulthood, 16 PSYCHOL. & 
AGING 206, 206 (2001) (summarizing a study on how future planning changes over time based upon a 
number of factors including age and feelings of control). 
 143 Quoidbach et al., supra note 6, at 96. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 97. 
 146 Id. at 96–97. 
 147 Id. at 96 (considering whether it was “possible that the discrepancy . . . was due entirely to the 
erroneous memory of reporters”). 
 148 MARGIE E. LACHMAN & SUZANNE L. WEAVER, THE MIDLIFE DEVELOPMENT INVENTORY 
(MIDI) PERSONALITY SCALES: SCALE CONSTRUCTION AND SCORING 2 (1997), https://www.
brandeis.edu/psychology/lachman/pdfs/midi-personality-scales.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T3U-QYR7] 
(“The MIDI includes 6 personality trait scales: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, 
Conscientiousness, Agreeableness (Communion), and Agency. These traits were measured using self-
ratings of 30 adjectives.”). See generally History & Overview of MIDUS, MIDLIFE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF HEALTH & WELL-BEING, http://midus.wisc.edu/
scopeofstudy.php [https://perma.cc/NSE3-DMS7] (providing background on the Midlife Development 
in the United States survey).  
 149 Quoidbach et al., supra note 6, at 96. 
 150 Id. (“[T]he magnitude of reported personality change in our sample was almost identical to the 
magnitude of actual personality change in the MIDUS sample . . . .”). 
 151 See, e.g., Gisela Labouvie-Vief & Fredda Blanchard-Fields, Cognitive Ageing and Psycholog-
ical Growth, 2 AGEING & SOC’Y 183, 195–99 (1982) (discussing how adults seek logical solutions 
when confronting the complexities, nuances, and ambiguities present in various moral dilemmas). 
 152 See, e.g., Mroczek & Kolarz, supra note 142, at 1333 (discussing how age related to positive 
or negative effects in the study). 
 153 Lance J. Rips, Sergey Blok, & George Newman, Tracing the Identity of Objects, 113 PSY-
CHOL. REV. 1, 2–7 (2006). 
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the latter amount to changes in identity.154 Accidental traits tend to be surface 
level, whereas essential traits tend to be deeper and possibly hidden from 
view.155 Essential traits also tend to be those that are causally efficacious.156 
Further studies revealed that normative valence—i.e. whether a trait is per-
ceived as being good or bad, rather than neutral—also plays an important role 
in identity.157 Traits that have a normative valence are more likely to be judged 
as essential. Combining the insights about the importance of causal efficacy 
and normative valence suggests that essential psychological traits are those 
that cause people to do good or bad things. In other words, the most important 
psychological connections for establishing diachronic identity are connected 
traits bearing on moral character.158 
Recent studies confirm precisely this.159 Earlier results from studies ask-
ing people to assess changes in their own identity were mixed.160 Neuroscien-
tific studies show how complex the process of self-assessment is,161 and how 
the end of history illusion162 and other mental impairments can confound peo-
ple’s first-personal judgments.163 Third-personal assessments about change and 
stability in others’ identities are more reliable. Initial work on third-personal 
                                                                                                                 
 154 Nina Strohminger & Shaun Nichols, The Essential Moral Self, 131 COGNITION 159, 159–60 
(2014). 
 155 Sergey Blok et al., Inferences About Personal Identity, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-
THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY 80, 84–85 (Johanna D. Moore & 
Keith Stenning eds., 2001); D. Geoffrey Hall et al., Preschoolers’ Use of Form Class Cues to Learn 
Descriptive Proper Names, 74 CHILD DEV. 1547, 1547 (2003). 
 156 Lance J. Rips & Susan J. Hespos, Divisions of the Physical World: Concepts of Objects and 
Substances, 141 PSYCHOL. BULL. 786, 789 (2015). 
 157 George E. Newman, Paul Bloom, & Joshua Knobe, Value Judgments and the True Self, 40 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 203, 203 (2014); George Newman, Julian De Freitas & Josh-
ua Knobe, Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment, 39 COGNITIVE 
SCI. 96, 99 (2015). 
 158 See Michael Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 29, 45 (1989) (“I 
think it is obvious that, in some sense, we are responsible for being the kind of people that we are—
i.e. for our characters. This includes responsibility for traits like greediness and honesty . . . .”); Ben-
jamin B. Sendor, The Relevance of Conduct and Character to Guilt and Punishment, 10 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 99, 100 (1996) (“[B]ad character in this context means a settled disposition 
. . . to commit acts that violate the law.” (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted)). 
 159 See, e.g., Nina Strohminger & Shaun Nichols, Neurodegeneration and Identity, 26 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 1469, 1469 (2015) (stating that moral traits are the most important aspect of identity). 
 160 See generally Roy F. Baumeister, The Self, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 680, 724 
(Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (“The executive function of the self is a mechanism that 
initiates, alters, and directs behavior.  .  .  . Social psychology has not understood the executive func-
tion as well as other aspects of the self.”). 
 161 Lindsey J. Powell et al., Dissociable Neural Substrates for Agentic Versus Conceptual Repre-
sentations of Self, 22 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 2186, 2193 (2009). 
 162 Quoidbach et al., supra note 6, at 96. 
 163 M.L. Eustache et al., Sense of Identity in Advanced Alzheimer’s Dementia: A Cognitive Disso-
ciation Between Sameness and Selfhood?, 22 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 1456, 1456 (2013). 
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assessments showed that moral character plays a central role in forming peo-
ple’s synchronic conceptions of each other.164 The most recent work focusing 
on diachronic identity establishes: 
The Essential-Moral-Self Hypothesis: A person’s “moral capacities 
are the most central part of [her] identity;”165 a sufficient change in 
these amounts to a change in personal identity.  
Researchers asked family members of patients suffering from neurodegenera-
tive disorders such as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), Alzheimer’s dis-
ease, and frontotemporal dementia, whether the patients were “still the same 
person underneath.”166 ALS and frontotemporal dementia result in moral im-
pairments, like increased dishonesty and reduced empathy.167 Alzheimer’s pa-
tients suffer a number of other impairments, for example, to memory, but not 
moral impairments.168 Family members also filled out a Morality-Personality 
Scale survey about the patient, reflecting how much the patient had changed 
across sixty-four different traits.169 The researchers discovered a strong corre-
lation between reported identity change and change in “moral” traits—like 
honesty, altruism, trustworthiness, and humility170—but not with respect to 
“non-moral” traits—like amnesia, disorientation, compulsivity, hygiene, and 
depression.171 The researchers concluded: “the moral faculty contributes to 
perceived identity more than does memory or nonpsychological neural facul-
ties such as voluntary motor control . . . .”172 
To summarize, this Part is working toward a criterion for determining 
when a present-day defendant is identical to a past criminal for purposes of 
conviction and punishment. The most promising philosophical perspective on 
diachronic personal identity focuses on psychological connections between 
past and present selves. This is enough to show that people’s identities are al-
                                                                                                                 
 164 Geoffrey P. Goodwin et al., Moral Character Predominates in Person Perception and Evalua-
tion, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 148, 148 (2013); Bogdan Wojciszke et al., On the Domi-
nance of Moral Categories in Impression Formation, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
1251, 1251 (1998). 
 165 See Jessie Prinz, An Empirical Case for Motivational Internalism, in MOTIVATIONAL INTER-
NALISM 61, 80–82 (Gunnar Björnsson et al. eds., 2015) (discussing how moral judgment motivates 
actions and choices). See generally Strohminger & Nichols, supra note 159. 
 166 Strohminger & Nichols, supra note 159, at 1470, 1472. 
 167 Steven W. Anderson et al., Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Dam-
age in Human Prefrontal Cortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCI. 1032, 1032 (1999). 
 168 Strohminger & Nichols, supra note 159, at 1475–76. 
 169 Id. at 1471. 
 170 Id. at 1469, 1475–76. 
 171 Id. at 1475. With respect to amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, there was also a weaker positive 
effect for aphasia. Id. at 1477. 
 172 Id. at 1472. 
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ways changing, given that time reduces the psychological connections every-
one has to their past selves. Recent work also shows that connections among 
moral character traits play the largest role in identity assessments. As such, a 
present-day defendant and a past criminal are more likely to be identical if they 
are connected by a sufficient number of moral character traits. “Sufficient” is a 
vague term, and Section I.C discusses what it should mean in the context of 
criminal law. 
C. As Adapted to Criminal Law 
How is the above philosophy and psychology relevant for the criminal 
law? This Article is not a discourse about the most metaphysically defensible 
theory of personal identity. Rather, it is concerned with what approach to per-
sonal identity is best suited to the concerns of criminal law. That is to say, the 
question is not, “when are people at different times actually different people?” 
but, “when should criminal law treat them as being different?” Of course, if 
they really are different, then criminal law should treat them as such. Never-
theless, short of a present-day person losing every last psychological connec-
tion to the criminal they once were, it is unclear where the line marking “real 
difference” starts. 
Vernon Madison, whose case opened this Article, seems to be very differ-
ent from the man he was three decades ago despite the fact that he still has 
some psychological connections to his earlier self. Madison could not remem-
ber his crime but still remembered his mother, who was alive at the time.173 
Madison’s case illustrates two points. First, a person does not have to lose all 
psychological connection to a past self to have a different identity. Second, 
relationships of psychological connectedness, and hence of personal identity, 
come in degrees: a person can retain more or fewer connections to their past 
selves.174 It is unlikely that philosophers and psychologists will ever find a per-
suasive account of where, metaphysically speaking, the absolute line between 
same and different selves lies. Perhaps no such line exists. Rather than rigid 
line drawing, the question should focus on whether the psychological connec-
tions between a past criminal and a present-day defendant are sufficiently at-
tenuated that criminal law should treat the defendant as being different from 
the past criminal. 
                                                                                                                 
 173 Madison II, 851 F.3d at 1179.  
 174 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959, 
990 (1992) (“Given the self’s scalarity, we can think of defenses in continuous and relative terms 
. . . .”). 
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1. An Account Limited to Criminal Law 
Although the motivation for this Article stems from the science and theo-
ry of personal identity generally, it is concerned with identity in just one con-
text—criminal law. There is no pretense that the conclusions reached below 
hold meaningfully outside of criminal law; indeed, there is good reason to sus-
pect they do not.175 Depending on the normative context of evaluation, a dif-
ferent sense of personal identity may be more appropriate.176  
Up to this Section, “personal identity” has been discussed as a seemingly 
unitary concept. It may be more appropriate, however, to talk about “personal 
identities.” Social psychologists have long understood that people assume dif-
ferent identities in different contexts.177 Who a person is as an employee may 
differ dramatically from who she is as a parent, friend, or lover.178 Multiple 
identities may coincide within a single body, and they must be tracked by ref-
erence to the context in which they arise. In pathological cases like dissociative 
identity disorder, these identities are psychologically sealed off from each oth-
er, so that one identity cannot access experiences or memories of the other.179 
In the ordinary case, the multiple socio-psychological identities are more po-
rous. For example, an employee may longingly recall the last weekend she 
spent with her child. 
Sometimes, a traumatic event can alter a person so jarringly that it causes 
a break in many of his identities.180 Phineas Gage’s story is an example that 
continues to fascinate neuroscientists.181 Gage was a railroad worker in the 
nineteenth century who, while tamping some black powder into a hole, acci-
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MAG. (Jan. 2010), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/phineas-gage-neurosciences-most-famous-
patient-11390067/ [https://perma.cc/F8PC-B4U5]. 
 181 Id. 
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dentally caused an explosion that blasted a steel rod through his skull.182 Alt-
hough he miraculously survived, he had irreparable brain damage.183 Before 
the accident, Gage “possessed a well-balanced mind, and was looked upon by 
those who knew him as a shrewd, smart business man, very energetic and per-
sistent in executing all his plans of operation.”184 After recovery, “his physical 
health [wa]s good,”185 but his personality had altered so much “that his friends 
and acquaintances said he was ‘no longer Gage.’”186 He became “fitful, irrev-
erent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity (which was not previously 
his custom), manifesting but little deference for his fellows . . . pertinaciously 
obstinate, yet capricious and vacillating.”187 It seemed that little of the pre-
accident Gage remained, regardless of social context. 
It may also be possible for just one social identity to change, leaving the 
others intact. This is likely the more ordinary case, happening in response to 
familiar and relatively pedestrian life developments. The super-star employee 
may begin to miss his child so much that he becomes unreliable at work to the 
point that his employer no longer recognizes him. The opposite may happen 
too, as the once playful and attentive father may find a new commitment to 
work and begin neglecting his child. 
A person’s various legal identities can also change independently of one 
another. Witness protection is perhaps the most striking example. Through the 
United States Federal Witness Protection Program, the United States Marshal 
has issued new legal identities and documents to approximately twenty-
thousand endangered witnesses and their family members.188 There is no pre-
tense that the program literally changes every legal aspect of who the partici-
pants are; however, in many legal respects, people protected by the program 
become new people. 
Bankruptcy is another familiar example.189 The language of bankruptcy 
has always been about “death,” “rebirth,” “fresh starts,” and “clean breaks.”190 
                                                                                                                 
 182 JOHN M. HARLOW, RECOVERY FROM THE PASSAGE OF AN IRON BAR THROUGH THE HEAD 4–5 
(1868), https://archive.org/stream/66210360R.nlm.nih.gov/66210360R_djvu.txt [https://perma.cc/6G2H-
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 183 Id. at 17 (“[The tamping rod’s] passage and exit must have produced serious lesion of the 
brain substance—the anterior and middle left lobes of the cerebrum—disintegrating and pulpifying it, 
drawing out a considerable quantity of it at the opening in the top of the head, and lacerating unques-
tionably the upper aspect of the falx major and the superior longitudinal sinus.”). 
 184 Id. at 14. 
 185 Id. at 13. 
 186 Id. at 14. 
 187 Id. at 13. 
 188 18 U.S.C. §§ 3521–3528 (2012); Witness Security Program, U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, https://
www.usmarshals.gov/witsec/ [https://perma.cc/HPP6-GW3M]. 
 189 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1330 (2012). 
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Functionally, bankruptcy offers a break in financial identity by dissociating a 
debtor from earlier debts, making them uncollectible.191 This affords a debtor a 
break in financial legal identity as a borrower. Although the bankruptcy debtor 
may receive a “new life free from debt[s],”192 other legal identities remain in-
tact. Post-bankruptcy, the debtor is still the spouse and aunt she was before 
bankruptcy, with all the rights and duties those legal statuses bring. Her identi-
ty as a potential criminal defendant also remains unchanged—bankruptcy does 
not discharge her liability for earlier criminal mischief. 
Just as bankruptcy law only purports to track a person’s financial identity, 
the proposals developed below only purport to track a person’s criminal identi-
ty. Considerations that bear on whether criminal law should recognize a change 
in identity may not translate to civil contexts. These bodies of law have fun-
damentally different purposes.193 Considerations of justice and deterrence are 
central to criminal law,194 whereas civil law attends more to matters of social 
efficiency,195 like optimal risk allocation196 or efficient breach.197 As such, the 
                                                                                                                 
 190 Harris v. Viegelahn, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1835 (2015) (stating that bankruptcy “allows a debtor to 
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notion of personal identity appropriate to criminal law and its interests may be 
very different from that which is appropriate to other contexts. 
Criminal Identity (general statement): Diachronic identity defined 
by reference to those features of a person, the persistence over time 
of which are relevant to criminal law’s purposes. 
A break in criminal identity need not signal a break in a person’s identity as a 
tortfeasor or a contractual counterparty—she may still be liable for past negli-
gence and promises made in those capacities. In what follows below, any men-
tion of “personal identity” refers to the notion pertinent to criminal law, with-
out carrying any implication for other legal or social “identities” a person may 
have. 
 Philosophically speaking, once talk of a person’s various identities (plu-
ral) enters the picture, the conversation might have shifted from the formal 
meaning of identity to the so-called “characterization” meaning.198 Philoso-
phers are careful to distinguish the two notions of identity.199 The latter ap-
proach views the self as a cumulative process through time that, at any given 
moment, has various characterizations.200 So long as the self-constituting pro-
cess remains the same, formal identity is maintained, even as various charac-
terizations of the self change. On such a view, criminal identity would be one 
characterization of the self—along with identity as a spouse, a parent, an em-
ployee, et cetera—that can change even as the underlying self remains the 
same.201 This Article is about criminal identity, and not about the self (if such 
exists) that has a criminal identity. So far as the criminal law is concerned, 
criminal identity is the only identity that matters. For simplicity, in what fol-
lows, I speak of “personal identity” as though it reduces to criminal identity. In 
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gives rise.”). 
 196 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[T]he owner’s 
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 201 See generally id. 
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different contexts, “personal identity” might more aptly correspond to different 
characterizations of the self or to the self itself (again, if such exists).  
2. Criminal Disposition as Criminal Identity 
It may not be immediately apparent why diachronic personal identity 
should be a pressing concern for criminal law. Does the law not get by fairly 
well in relative ignorance of the philosophy and psychology of personal identi-
ty? Criminal law’s ordinary process ties personal identity to bodily continuity: 
punishing the right person is a matter of finding whose body committed the 
crime.202 Where short time intervals are concerned, bodily continuity generally 
brings with it the psychological connections that are the other candidate crite-
ria for identifying past and present selves.203 The cases where bodily continuity 
obviously fails as a criterion—for example, dissociative identity disorder or 
personality-altering brain trauma—seem to be rare enough that no special doc-
trines have been developed to handle them. 
If the arguments of Sections I.A and I.B are correct, the apparent reliabil-
ity of the bodily continuity as a criterion for personal identity is mistaken. The 
end of history illusion shows that we fall into error when making predictions 
about our future identities. Like all illusions, the error is not self-presenting. 
We cannot see that it is an error, even after it is pointed out to us. The present 
concern is that “criminal law[’s] presuppos[ition] that we are one person over 
time,” is the product of a similar illusion.204 Just as we cannot observe our own 
future identities, we cannot directly observe anyone else’s past or present iden-
tities. If we entertain an illusory confidence about the stability of our own un-
observable future identities, perhaps we mislead ourselves about other people’s 
unobservable past identities. 
For the criminal law to adhere to the identity principle and punish only 
those who commit crimes, it must confront the possibility that bodily continui-
                                                                                                                 
 202 Ferzan, supra note 61, at 384 (“[W]e see at least a very thin metaphysical account of personal 
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ty is an unreliable guide to personal identity.205 If the law is prepared to set 
aside bodily continuity for cases of severe brain damage and dissociative iden-
tity disorders,206 it should be equally prepared to do so when natural processes, 
by greater or lesser degrees, bring about similar changes.207 As discussed, a 
greater focus on psychological criteria for diachronic identity better aligns 
criminal law with people’s considered intuitions. The few criminal law schol-
ars who have addressed personal identity almost uniformly agree that psycho-
logical criteria—particularly psychological connections—should be the focus 
of concern.208 This Article proceeds on that assumption. 
The question confronting criminal law is not, “when do our naturally 
evolving personal identities make us into categorically different people?” Ra-
ther it is, “when do we become different enough so that criminal law loses its 
legitimate interest in us for past crimes?” In other words, “how long and what 
does it take for a person to lose her criminal identity?” Psychological connect-
edness, even when limited to connections of moral character, comes in de-
grees.209 A present-day person can have more or fewer psychological connec-
tions with a past self, and those connections generally dissipate as the time gap 
increases. Supposing, as suggested above, that a person’s criminal identity 
changes at some point before the last psychological connection is severed, the 
issue enters the world of vagueness where bright metaphysical lines prove eva-
sive. If criminal law is to confront the challenge posed by personal identity, it 
needs a framework for ordering the vague landscape.210 Where metaphysics is 
vague, normative considerations—in this case, those relevant to criminal 
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law—can help fill in the gaps.211 Just as what we are responsible for depends 
on who and what we are, what and who we are can depend on what we are re-
sponsible for.212 
A theory of criminal identity that looks to psychological connections must 
answer two questions: what psychological connections count, and when are 
there enough (or few enough) of them that a present-day person is, so far as 
criminal law should be concerned, identical to (or different from) a past crimi-
nal? As to the first question, this Article has pointed to empirical studies show-
ing that people’s intuitions tend to give primacy of place among psychological 
connections to those that relate to moral character. If, as Oliver Wendell 
Holmes observed, “[t]he law can ask no better justification than the deepest 
instincts of man,”213 this should be enough to make a prima facie case. 
Of course, the legitimate scope of criminal law’s interest in personal mor-
al character cannot be entirely open-ended. It must be circumscribed by the 
legitimate scope of criminal law. In general, theorists tend to think that there 
are some matters of merely private morality (for example, being courteous to 
strangers or attending church regularly) and others where criminal law appro-
priately gets involved (for example, stealing things or hitting people). This Ar-
ticle does not seek to enter the frays of the debate about what behavior legiti-
mately interests criminal law. Instead, this Article proposes that criminal law’s 
legitimate interest in personal character is limited to those character traits that 
dispose people to do things in which criminal law has a legitimate interest. For 
example, physical assault is surely one of those things. Character traits that 
dispose someone to commit physical assault, if not checked by counterbalanc-
ing traits of restraint, are of interest to criminal law. Rudeness is surely not one 
of those things, so character traits that dispose someone to disregard common 
social graces are of no legitimate interest to criminal law. The sorts of psycho-
logical connections that matter for a theory of criminal identity, then, are char-
acter traits that dispose people to criminal conduct (legitimately defined). 
The approach to criminal identity that is beginning to emerge has obvious 
resonances with character theories of punishment.214 On these theories, the 
purpose of criminal law is to punish people whose criminal conduct manifests 
bad character. If, for some reason, seemingly criminal conduct does not pro-
vide evidence of a person’s bad character—perhaps the person was acting un-
der duress or with a reasonable mistake of fact—then criminal law can have no 
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interest in prosecuting her.215 Similarly, it should follow that if a present-day 
person no longer shares character traits with a past criminal, the past criminal’s 
misconduct cannot provide evidence of the present-day person’s bad charac-
ter.216 
Process of elimination also strengthens the case that character traits are 
the most plausible anchor for criminal identity. Some mental states—like in-
tentions and desires—are too fragile to identify present with past criminals. 
The criminal act itself may extinguish whatever intentions and desires moti-
vated it. At the opposite extreme, some criminal law theorists have proposed 
anchoring criminal identity to a so-called “formal agency.”217 The pseudo-
religious notions that cloak this supposedly inextinguishable psychological 
process, however, cannot have much claim on criminal law in a pluralist socie-
ty. A more common intermediate approach focuses instead on memories.218 
Although memories have the formal advantage of some durability without be-
ing inextinguishable, the case for tying identity to memories is hard to moti-
vate. Why would memory matter for attributing past crimes to present-day 
people? Imagine a person who has such a casual attitude toward her horrific 
crimes that she soon forgets them. It is implausible that she now deserves no 
punishment due to that fact alone. 
Among the salient psychological alternatives discussed in the literature, 
this leaves moral character as the most plausible tether for criminal idenity, 
along with all the enduring personality traits, preferences, and value commit-
ments that help constitute it.219 Unlike intentions, character traits have some 
                                                                                                                 
 215 MODEL PENAL CODE I § 2.04 (discussing mistake of fact as a defense); id. § 2.09 (discussing 
the defense of duress). 
 216 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 174, at 974 (“I am responsible for my character in the sense that 
my character’s emanations and manifestations are simply generated by me.”); Ferzan, supra note 61, 
at 389 (“When an individual develops a new character that is different from her character when she 
committed the crime, she is ‘not herself’ and does not deserve blame.”). 
 217 See, e.g., ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM 69 (2009) (“Whatever fundamental 
changes characters undergo, the identity that persists through them is that of their formal agency . . . . 
[B]ecause the agent is so abstract and characterless, it can persist throughout changes of character, so 
that judicial punishment is not undeserved just because the character clothing the agent has changed or 
because the agent chose an action unreflective of its character.”). 
 218 See, e.g., Locke, supra note 12, at 49 (“For whatsoever any substance has thought or done, 
which I cannot recollect, and by my consciousness make my own thought and action, it will no more 
belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other 
immaterial being anywhere existing.”); Snead, supra note 59, at 1198 (“[T]his Article will argue that 
there is a deep relationship between memory and the foundational principles justifying how punish-
ment should be distributed.”). 
 219 Saks, supra note 60, at 412 (“In discussing psychological personhood I have focused on conti-
nuity of memory, as well as of other psychological characteristics: beliefs, intentions, traits of person-
ality. . . . But . . . character, and not just the momentary mental state animating an act, plays an im-
portant role in criminality.”). 
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stability. Unlike formal agency, character can be scientifically described. And 
unlike memory, the moral and criminal justice significance of character is plain 
to see: “asserting subject-responsibility for character affirms [one’s] identity 
with [one’s] character as that by virtue of which [one is] the author of certain 
objects and events,” including crimes.220 The person with a casual attitude to-
ward horrific crimes she soon forgets is still condemnable precisely because 
her casual attitude continues to manifest a morally repulsive endorsement of 
the past conduct and a present disposition to reoffend. 
Having settled on criminal character traits as the relevant psychological 
connections, the second question that needs answering for a complete theory of 
criminal identity is: when are there few enough connections between a present 
person and a past criminal such that criminal law should recognize a break in 
identity? As noted above, previous theorists have supposed that a criminal 
must undergo drastic psychological changes as a consequence of tragedy or 
disease to lose her criminal identity. Although tragedy and disease can alter 
character, so can natural developments over the course of life. Additionally, it 
is not obvious that the magnitude of the psychological change always needs to 
be drastic. Of course, at the extreme end of the spectrum, a change sufficient to 
remove any criminal characterological disposition should be sufficient to ex-
tinguish criminal identity. It may be an open question whether any charactero-
logical change short of that could also be sufficient—a weakening rather than a 
removal of disposition. As a general rule, the extent of the necessary change 
should be a function of criminal law’s normative interest in the crime at issue. 
The more serious the criminal violation, the greater criminal law’s interest, and 
the more characterological change should be required to signal a break in iden-
tity. The less serious, the less needed change. 
In sum, the account of diachronic criminal identity defended here for use 
in criminal law is as follows: 
Criminal Identity (detailed statement): If a present-day person re-
tains enough of the character traits that disposed a past person to 
commit a crime, the two share a criminal identity. As a general rule, 
if a present-day person retains none of those traits, she is not identi-
cal to the past criminal. Also, as a general rule, the degree of charac-
terological change required for a break in criminal identity is in-
versely related to the magnitude of criminal law’s normative interest 
in the underlying crime. 
The implications of this account of criminal identity for criminal law are po-
tentially vast. For it to have purchase, however, it will help to show that a sig-
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nificant aspect of criminal law already embraces it. A preexisting inroad could 
serve as a catalyst for change. Part II uncovers that inroad.221 First, though, this 
Part closes by addressing an important objection. 
3. One Important Criminal Policy Objection 
One concern about tying criminal identity to connections of moral charac-
ter—indeed, about any theory of criminal identity according to which it can 
change—is that it opens the door to stratagems for avoiding punishment.222 As 
one paper put the challenge to a related theory of identity: “If a continuous 
personality were required for personal identity, and if personal identity were 
required for punishment, then one could escape punishment by changing one’s 
personality after committing a crime. Criminals who plan such an escape 
should not be excused.”223 Imagine, for example, a pill that could change a 
person’s criminal identity. Should criminals be able to avoid punishment simp-
ly by taking it?224 And if they could, would that not undermine criminal jus-
tice? 
There are two lines of response. One is the path of practical compromise. 
The objection focuses on “planned” changes in identity. Perhaps those changes 
should be treated differently from others that occur naturally, or through unex-
pected disease or tragedy. This approach would preserve the general signifi-
cance of criminal identity, without incentivizing strategic criminal behavior. 
A stronger line of response would confront the objection head on. The ob-
jection rests on a question-begging confusion. In asking whether someone, af-
ter taking the pill, should be excused from punishment for their past crimes, it 
assumes that the person’s identity survives the medication. According to the 
theory developed here, the person would—for all intents and purposes relevant 
to criminal law—become a different person. There would then be no crime 
from which they could be excused—a different person committed it. Although, 
in a sense, this approach would frustrate some objectives of criminal law—a 
past crime would go unpunished—that result is not unusual in criminal law. 
Self-destruction has always been, and always will be, an effective means of 
escaping criminal justice. 
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The objector might criticize the analogy between the character-altering 
pill and suicide. The pill only changes criminal identity, something considera-
bly short of suicide (destruction of the body) or the termination of all psycho-
logical connections (only characterological connections would change). Maybe 
this introduces unique criminal justice and strategic concerns that suicide does 
not. 
The best approach for developing a response is to step systematically 
through criminal law’s most important concerns. Criminal law is typically 
thought to have four basic purposes: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
incapacitation.225 As argued, any retributive worry is impossible to motivate 
without begging the question of whether the same person is available for pun-
ishment. So far as rehabilitation and incapacitation are concerned, someone 
who transforms their criminal identity—whether by taking a pill or other-
wise—has already completed criminal law’s work for it. A break in criminal 
identity, by definition, involves a removal of criminal disposition. That leaves 
nothing in need of reform or incapacitation. 
The most salient criminal justice concern with the present proposal is de-
terrence. If people can commit crimes and avoid punishment by changing their 
criminal identity, will they really be deterred? This concern assumes that crim-
inals will not hesitate to take a character-altering pill if it helps them escape 
punishment. It is not certain, however, that this is a decision people would take 
lightly. Even though character alteration is certainly something short of biolog-
ical death, it is a profound alteration of identity. If criminals are attached to 
their sense of self, the prospect of significantly changing who they are will not 
be an attractive alternative. 
To the extent criminals are willing to take the criminal-identity-altering 
pill, giving them strong incentives to take the pill may be the best way to 
achieve the goals of deterrence. Consider available statistics on first-time and 
repeat crimes. The numbers behind high recidivism rates are familiar: “68 per-
cent of released state prisoners [a]re arrested within three years, 79 percent 
within six years and 83 percent within nine years.”226 Somewhat less familiar 
is the figure these recidivism rates necessarily imply: most of the crime com-
mitted in the United States is repeat crime. According to the most recent statis-
tics from the United States Sentencing Commission, approximately fifty-five 
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2019] Limiting Identity in Criminal Law 2049 
percent of all arrestees have two or more criminal history points.227 Only some 
fraction of the remaining forty-five percent has no criminal history points.228 
Having even one criminal history point means that a criminal has previously 
been convicted and a) the conviction was for a crime of violence, b) the con-
viction resulted in imprisonment of at least sixty days, or c) the conviction re-
sulted in a criminal justice sentence during the pendency of which the criminal 
committed another crime.229 
If most crimes are repeat crimes, an effective preventive strategy would 
focus on repeat offenses rather than first offenses. Criminal law already tries to 
do this to some extent by imposing increasingly harsh sentences for people 
with longer criminal histories.230 The high recidivism rates, however, show just 
how ineffective this strategy is in isolation. Its preventive effects could be en-
hanced if it were paired with positive incentives for those criminals who could 
credibly demonstrate the sort of change necessary for a break in criminal iden-
tity—a lost disposition toward criminality. If a pill could make this process 
easy and credible, so much the better for assuring the effectiveness of the poli-
cy. The availability of a criminal-identity-altering pill combined with excusing 
any criminals who take it could lead to a dramatic reduction in crime. 
One might worry that the pill, even if it reduces repeat crime, might in-
crease the number of first-time offenses. To offset a reduction in the number of 
repeat offenses, the number of first-time offenders would have to increase by 
more than double.231 In other words, the number of people who presently re-
frain from criminal conduct only because they are deterred by the threat of 
sanction and who are willing to take a character-altering pill would have to 
exceed the number of present first-time offenders. As others have persuasively 
argued, though, the number of people who refrain from crime just because they 
are deterred by the threat of sanction is likely small; most people avoid crime 
because they agree that crime is wrong.232 The portion of people who avoid 
crime just because they are deterred and who are also prepared to alter their 
identities in fundamental ways would necessarily be smaller still. So, the con-
cern that the present theory of criminal identity would lead to a dramatic rise in 
first-time offenders is likely unfounded. 
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In short, the present theory of criminal identity would improve criminal 
law’s effectiveness with respect to all its purposes, including reducing the inci-
dence of crime. Seemingly paradoxically, the remainder of this Article argues 
that the present theory would accomplish this with fewer prosecutions and less 
punishment. 
II. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AS LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL IDENTITY 
The fact that one in every eleven inmates is serving a life sentence is a 
stark reminder that criminal law frequently views personal identity in terms of 
bodily continuity.233 Every U.S. jurisdiction (except Alaska) allows sentences 
of life without parole.234 Until 2010, most states even permitted such sentences 
for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses.235 By indefinitely imprison-
ing the same body, society seems to assume that it can indefinitely imprison 
the same person. 
Are there any doctrinal threads that imply a different conclusion: that per-
sonal identity is linked to psychology and can change over time? Other schol-
ars have expressed skepticism: “the picture of personal identity generally in 
place in our criminal justice system does not buy into the ‘change in identity’ 
theory.”236 This Part suggests that there is more room for optimism. In at least 
one important respect—a commitment to statutes of limitations—criminal law 
seems to countenance that people’s identities can change over time. Courts and 
commentators almost universally regard statutes of limitations as policy com-
promises that conserve scarce justice resources and protect process integrity.237 
This Article argues, however, that traditional rationales cannot explain two 
basic features of statutes of limitations: that they bar prosecution and that more 
serious crimes have longer limitations periods.238 The “identity limiting ac-
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count” of statutes of limitations, proposed below, handles both features easily. 
According to that account, statutes of limitations serve implicitly to recognize 
that criminal identity changes with time. After a period, it would be unjust to 
prosecute anyone for a past crime because doing so would necessarily target 
someone who is of no legitimate interest to the criminal justice system. If 
criminal law is willing to countenance the fact that criminal identity changes 
over time where statutes of limitations are concerned, this may be an opening 
for reform elsewhere. 
A. History and Background 
Statutes of limitations are “law[s] that bar[] claims after a certain period 
of time passes after an injury.”239 For civil actions, they trace back to Roman 
times.240 Parliament passed the earliest Anglo-American statute of limitations 
in 1236; it applied only to actions for real property.241 The civil statutes of 
limitations that would come in the following centuries prohibited actions de-
pending on when they arose in relation to a single fixed date, like the corona-
tion of a new king.242 The Limitations Act of 1623 launched the modern ap-
proach to limitations on actions by specifying generally applicable periods, 
rather than dates, within which actions had to commence.243 
The defining feature of modern criminal statutes of limitations is: 
First Basic Feature of Criminal Statutes of Limitations: Once the 
limitations period runs after a crime, the state may not prosecute an-
yone for that crime. 
Criminal statutes of limitations also trace back to Rome, which imposed a 
twenty-year limitations period for most prosecutions.244 The common law nev-
er developed criminal statutes of limitations,245 and England still has none that 
apply generally.246 This is because of the enduring influence of the common 
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law doctrine, quod nullum tempus occurrit regi—time does not run against the 
King (in whose name criminal actions were brought).247 
Despite English reluctance, criminal statutes of limitations have been a 
fixture of American law since early in its history.248 Massachusetts had a one-
year limitations period for most crimes as early as 1652.249 New Jersey intro-
duced its first criminal limitations period in 1796, soon after the American 
founding.250 The forebear of the current federal statute of limitations was 
passed in 1790.251 Now, almost every U.S. jurisdiction has general limitations 
periods applicable to all misdemeanors and felonies,252 excepting murder253 
and other capital offenses.254 Only South Carolina and Wyoming have no crim-
inal limitations periods at all.255 Five states—Kentucky,256 Maryland,257 North 
Carolina,258 Virginia,259 and West Virginia260—have limitations periods for 
misdemeanors, but no general limitations statute applicable to felonies. These 
five, however, still have limitations periods for selected felonies.261 
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For criminal statutes of limitations, the period begins to run from the time 
of the offense.262 Courts mark the time of the offense from the moment the 
crime is complete,263 i.e. “when every element occurs.”264 The exceptions to 
this rule are “continuing offenses,”265 such as conspiracy,266 welfare fraud,267 
and failing to register as a sex offender.268 For these, the limitations period be-
gins to run “when the course of conduct or the defendant’s complicity therein 
is terminated.”269 Calculating the expiry of a limitations period is not always a 
straightforward matter of counting days on a calendar. Various events and cir-
cumstances, such as the defendant fleeing from justice270 or being absent from 
the jurisdiction,271 can “toll” the limitations period, effectively extending it. 
Few generalizations characterize the length of limitations periods. Alt-
hough the periods for felonies tend to range from three to six years and for 
misdemeanors from one to three,272 “there is considerable variation in statutes 
of limitations for identical crimes across jurisdictions within the United 
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States.”273 For example, Ohio’s limitations period for arson is twenty years,274 
whereas Iowa’s is three.275 Georgia has a fifteen-year statute of limitation for 
rape,276 whereas Arkansas’ is six.277 
There is, however, one universal feature of limitations periods in the 
United States: 
Second Basic Feature of Criminal Statutes of Limitations: The 
“length of [the limitations period] increases as the seriousness of the 
offense rises.”278 
For example, the Model Penal Code’s limitations periods range from a six-
month period for petty misdemeanors up to six years for first-degree felo-
nies.279 This correlation between crime seriousness and length of limitations 
periods is so universal that it holds internationally across civil law jurisdictions 
as well.280 
Only one paper, whose authors conducted an impressive cross-state sur-
vey, disputes the relationship between crime seriousness and period length.281 
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As the authors demonstrate, states often apply a single limitations period to 
felonies that, they argue, differ in their seriousness.282 As they note, however, 
their results are likely due to the legislative shorthand of “lump[ing] together 
different offenses in the same broad ‘Class’ or ‘Degree’ category.”283 When a 
state defines two felonies as being of the same degree, it presumptively sees 
them as being equally serious, i.e. as deserving similar punishment.284 There-
fore, it would make sense that the state would apply similar limitations periods 
to them both. As the study’s authors concede, all states uniformly apply shorter 
limitations periods to misdemeanors than to felonies.285 
B. Inadequacy of Traditional Justifications 
“[W]hy is peace more desirable after twenty years than before?”286 Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’ nonplussed question a century ago continues to perplex 
scholars today. The mere passage of time is unrelated to the traditional inter-
ests of criminal justice, such as retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.287 
The age of a crime, standing alone, has no direct bearing on whether it de-
serves punishment.288 A rape that occurred ten years ago is just as reprehensi-
ble today. Deterring rape by punishing its incidence is just as important now as 
it was in the past.289 Society has just as much interest in rehabilitating a sex 
offender, regardless of whether his criminal disposition arose yesterday or yes-
teryear.290 
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Because statutes of limitation are keyed to time, but time seems irrele-
vant, they “always have vexed the philosophical mind.”291 One of the leading 
commentators on statutes of limitations put the apparent absurdity of the situa-
tion in stark terms: although a criminal “has committed the offense, caused the 
harm sought to be prevented by the statute, and has no claim that his conduct is 
justified or excused, [he] may nonetheless have a defense.”292 Congress has 
offered little justificatory insight; despite there being several statutory enact-
ments—new limitations, extensions, modifications, et cetera—the legislative 
history is sparse.293 Academic articles with titles referencing confusion, like 
“The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitations,”294 predominate the litera-
ture, alongside calls to abolish criminal statutes of limitations entirely.295 Even 
Congress itself, through its frequent extension of limitations periods for vari-
ous crimes in the last few decades, may be evincing skepticism.296 
And yet, as the Supreme Court has noted, “[s]tatutes of limitations are vi-
tal to the welfare of society and are favored in the law. They are found and ap-
proved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence. . . . An important public 
policy lies at their foundation.”297 It is a public policy that statutes of limita-
tions are uniquely positioned to serve. The other backstop to stale criminal 
charges—due process298—is a very weak safeguard.299 Courts and scholars 
have tried to offer accounts of what the “important public policy” behind crim-
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inal statutes of limitations might be.300 All seem to agree that whatever that 
public policy is, it must be unique to the criminal context because civil statutes 
of limitations serve different goals.301 
Despite the absence of legislative history, statutes of limitations seem to 
“represent legislative assessments of relative interests of the State and the de-
fendant in administering and receiving justice.”302 Available justifications for 
statutes of limitations fall into two categories: those according to which prose-
cuting old crimes is “unproductive for society”303 and those according to which 
such prosecution is “unfair to the perpetrator.”304 As the Supreme Court has 
noted: “Most statutes of limitations seek primarily to protect defendants 
against stale or unduly delayed claims. . . . [Others seek] to achieve a broader 
system-related goal, such as facilitating the administration of claims . . . or 
promoting judicial efficiency.”305 According to both types of justification, the 
passage of time is not itself directly relevant to the interests of criminal justice; 
rather, time correlates with factors that are relevant to those interests. Regard-
less, as argued below, none of the available justifications can explain the two 
basic features of criminal statutes of limitations: that they prevent the state 
from punishing crime and that limitations periods are longer for more serious 
crimes.306 
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WM. & MARY L. REV. 199, 259 (1995) (“The criminal limitations statute is only partially similar in 
form and purpose to its civil counterpart and is clearly different in its overall place and function in the 
law.”); Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 240, at 1185–86 (“In ordinary 
private civil litigation, the public policy of limitations lies in avoiding the disrupting effect that unset-
tled claims have on commercial intercourse . . . . Somewhat different considerations present them-
selves in disputes between a private person and the sovereign.”).  
 302 Marion, 404 U.S. at 322. 
 303 Adlestein, supra note 301, at 220. 
 304 Id.; see Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 240, at 1186 (“Where the 
legislature puts a limit on criminal prosecutions, it recognizes the defendant’s special interest in not 
being compelled to put his freedom and his reputation at the hazard of what is likely to be the parol 
evidence of imperfectly remembered events, while at the same time it denies the social utility of pun-
ishing crimes long past.” (footnote omitted)). 
 305 John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008) (citations omitted). 
 306 Some scholars propose that these features should be modified. See, e.g., Andrew J. Wistrich, 
Procrastination, Deadlines, and Statutes of Limitations, 50 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 607, 611–13 
(2008) (discussing the “serious flaws” of the current statutes of limitations system and their harm to 
justice and society). This Article takes statutes of limitations as they are and historically have been. 
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1. Prosecuting Old Crimes as Unfair to the Defendant 
One group of justifications for statutes of limitations focuses on the po-
tential unfairness to the defendant of prosecuting stale offenses.307 These justi-
fications emphasize that as time passes, a potential defendant’s interest in be-
ing free from prosecution grows and eventually outweighs whatever interest 
the state could have in bringing the case. In the words of the Model Penal 
Code commentary, “[a]fter a period of time, a person ought to be allowed to 
live without fear of prosecution.”308 Justifications in this group differ regarding 
the grounds upon which the defendant’s interest lies—access to the best evi-
dence or the right of repose. 
According to the first approach, the “[f]oremost [objective of limitations 
provisions] is the desirability of requiring that prosecutions be based upon rea-
sonably fresh evidence.”309 The underlying assumption here is that evidence is 
“fragile.”310 “With the passage of time memory becomes less reliable, witness-
es may die or become otherwise unavailable; physical evidence becomes more 
difficult to obtain, more difficult to identify and more likely to become con-
taminated.”311 At some point, the available evidence becomes so unreliable, the 
argument goes, that no fair trial is possible.312 Even DNA evidence, which 
does not spoil and can provide nearly incontrovertible proof of physical acts, 
cannot speak to critical elements of mind and circumstance.313 
Although it is certainly true that older evidence is less reliable, it is un-
clear why this should mean “it will be more difficult . . . to defend . . . against 
[old] charges.”314 In a criminal trial, the burdens of proof are not evenly dis-
tributed between prosecution and defense.315 Because the prosecution must 
                                                                                                                 
 307 Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 240, at 1185 (“The primary 
consideration underlying such legislation is undoubtedly one of fairness to the defendant.”). 
 308 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (current version at § 1.06) cmt. 16–17 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 5, 1956) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07, Tent. Draft No. 5]. 
 309 Id. at cmt. 16.  
 310 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944) (after a 
time, “evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared”); Thiggen v. 
Smith, 792 F.2d 1507, 1514 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[E]vidence is, by its nature, fragile and susceptible to 
destruction over time, as memories fade and witnesses die or become otherwise unavailable.”). 
 311 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07, Tent. Draft No. 5, supra note 308, at cmt. 16.  
 312 Marion, 404 U.S. at 322 (“[Statutes of limitations] specify[] a limit beyond which there is an 
irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair trial would be prejudiced.”). 
 313 See generally Erin Murphy, DNA in the Criminal Justice System: A Congressional Research 
Service Report* (*From the Future), 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 340, 345–47 (2016) (offering a 
summary of DNA practices as it relates to criminal justice).  
 314 DANIEL W. SHUMAN & ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE PROSECUTION OF 
OLD CRIMES: BALANCING LEGAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND MORAL CONCERNS 61 (2000). 
 315 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.8(a) (6th ed. 2017) (describing the burdens of proof 
in a criminal trial). 
2019] Limiting Identity in Criminal Law 2059 
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt,316 any doubts about the overall 
quality of evidence favor the defendant.317 The trial process itself—from the 
criminal rules of evidence,318 to the right to confront witnesses,319 to the me-
chanics of cross-examination320—is oriented toward excluding unreliable evi-
dence.321 Far from increasing the risk of convicting the innocent, the general 
effect of time on evidence is to increase the risk of letting the guilty go free.322 
The fresh evidence account also cannot explain why limitations periods 
should be longer for more serious crimes. Evidence that spoils with time 
should spoil equally for all crimes.323 Assuming, as the fresh evidence account 
requires, that the passage of time increases the risk of a wrongful conviction, it 
would do this for heinous and trivial crimes alike.324 What does vary between 
crimes of different seriousness is the defendant’s interest in fairness—a person 
has a much greater stake in accuracy when the potential penalties are higher.325 
                                                                                                                 
 316 Id. 
 317 Michael Rowe, Contemporary Prosecutions of Civil Rights Era Crimes: An Argument Against 
Retroactive Application of Statute of Limitations Amendments, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 
722 (2011) (“[E]vidence spoliation typically has a disproportionate effect on the prosecution rather 
than the defense since the state is charged with meeting the reasonable doubt standard.”). 
 318 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401 (requiring only relevant evidence to be admitted); id. 403 (exclud-
ing relevant evidence for prejudice, confusion, waste of time, or other reasons); id. 803 (omitting 
unreliable evidence based on hearsay); see ROBINSON, supra note 35, § 202(b) (“[T]rial process and 
the rules of evidence are specifically designed either to exclude unreliable evidence or to assure that 
the jury is aware of any such unreliability.”). 
 319 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (explaining the common law origins of the 
Confrontation Clause and the important evidentiary purpose it holds). 
 320 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (“[P]robably no one, certainly no one experienced 
in the trial of lawsuits, would deny the value of cross-examination in exposing falsehood and bringing 
out the truth in the trial of a criminal case.”). 
 321 Adlestein, supra note 301, at 265 (“The criminal trial process is specifically designed by its 
rules of evidence, by its strong commitment to the power of cross-examination, and, most importantly, 
by its requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to exclude or discredit unreliable evidence.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 322 Wistrich, supra note 306, at 664–65. 
 323 Charles C. Callahan, Statutes of Limitation—Background, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 134 (1955). 
(“[T]here is no reason to suppose that the statutory periods bear any actual relation to the duration of 
memory, continued availability of witnesses, or time for which documents are, or can be, pre-
served. . . . It is apparent that something other than availability, or lack of availability, of evidence lies 
back of the several different limitation periods which may appear in the statutes of a single jurisdic-
tion.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 324 See SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 314, at 88–91 (discussing the limitations and weaknesses of 
human memory over long stretches of time despite however heinous a crime was); Kitai-Sangero, 
supra note 278, at 428 (“There is no reason to think, of course, that witnesses may better remember 
over a long period of time the circumstances surrounding felony offenses compared to the circum-
stances surrounding misdemeanors.”). 
 325 Note, The Statute of Limitations, supra note 278, at 636 (“Where a crime is especially serious 
and the punishment is correspondingly great it would seem particularly important to protect the de-
fendant’s right to garner reliable information for a defense and prevent the use of stale evidence 
against him.”). 
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As a consequence, the fresh evidence account should instead demand shorter 
limitations periods for more serious crimes. 
The Supreme Court has offered a second interest that might justify stat-
utes of limitations: the right of repose.326 According to the Court, there is a 
“long-standing congressional ‘policy’,” “fundamental to our society and our 
criminal law,” of eventually granting potential defendants the peace of mind 
that the past is behind them.327 As such, “statutes of limitations are to be liber-
ally interpreted in favor of repose.”328 
Yet the right to repose is a flawed basis for statutes of limitations. As one 
commentator bluntly put the matter, “[p]erpetrators of extremely serious 
crimes should not be entitled to calmness while their victims and the relatives 
of victims suffer from permanent damage and have no peace of mind in their 
lifetime.”329 Even for less serious crimes, it is far from clear what entitles crim-
inals to the peace of mind that they will not be prosecuted. To the extent 
unprosecuted criminals do have an interest in repose, they have a very easy 
way to secure it for themselves—they can deliver themselves to authorities and 
accept the coming sanction.330 After that, they have a constitutional guarantee 
of repose in the Double Jeopardy Clause,331 which proscribes twice punishing 
a criminal for the same offense.332 This repose is an even stronger assurance 
than the mere statutory protection of a limitations period.333 
Furthermore, as with the fresh evidence account, the right of repose can-
not explain why more serious crimes have longer limitations periods. Surely 
any interest in repose increases proportionately with the threat from which the 
repose would protect. Because more serious crimes carry greater sanctions, 
one would expect the right of repose would also demand a shorter limitations 
period. 
                                                                                                                 
 326 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970). 
 327 Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 215–16 (1953). 
 328 Marion, 404 U.S. at 322 n.14. 
 329 Kitai-Sangero, supra note 278, at 434. 
 330 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2012) (“In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by 
the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evi-
dence if it is voluntarily given.” (emphasis added)). 
 331 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”). 
 332 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (“The constitutional prohibition against 
‘double jeopardy’ was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial 
and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.”). 
 333 Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U.S. 245, 255 (1890) (“It is the settled doctrine of this court that the 
legislature may prescribe a limitation for the bringing of suits where none previously existed, as well 
as shorten the time within which suits to enforce existing causes of action may be commenced.”). 
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2. Prosecuting Old Crimes as Unproductive for Society 
A second group of justifications for statutes of limitations argues that with 
the passage of time, something changes that diminishes society’s interest in 
prosecution.334 The criminal justice process is not costless. Scarce judicial and 
prosecutorial resources must be allocated.335 The act of punishment itself im-
poses costs on the state, on the convict, and collaterally on those who rely on 
the convict.336 At some point, the reasoning goes, the balance of costs and ben-
efits tips against prosecution.337 There are three prominent approaches to justi-
fying statutes of limitations in terms of balancing social costs and benefits: 
retributive, economic, and procedural.338 The following discusses each in turn. 
According to the first line of argument, what decreases with time is socie-
ty’s retributive interest in punishment.339 Unfortunately for this approach, no 
one has offered a theoretical or empirical framework that might support the 
claim. Although there is some ambiguity as to what “retributive interest” 
                                                                                                                 
 334 See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 317, at 713 (“The individual standing trial is not the only party 
whose substantive rights are affected by a change in the statute of limitations. The government has a 
substantial interest in ensuring justice in incarcerating criminals to prevent them from committing 
subsequent offenses. Additionally, the family members of the victims have substantive interest in 
seeing justice come to bear on those responsible for the deaths of their relatives.”). 
 335 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (noting that “[c]ourts should think carefully 
before expending ‘scarce judicial resources’ to resolve difficult and novel questions of constitutional 
or statutory interpretation that will ‘have no effect on the outcome of the case’”); Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (justifying a state’s interest in securing guilty pleas because “with 
the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved”); Edward J. Brunet, A 
Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 
12 GA. L. REV. 701, 746 (1978) (explaining the need for an efficient allocation of the scarce resources 
of the judiciary); Crystal S. Yang, Resource Constraints and the Criminal Justice System: Evidence 
from Judicial Vacancies, 8 AM. ECON. J. 289, 289–92 (2016) (studying the effects resource con-
straints have on the criminal justice system and finding that prosecutors dismiss cases more often 
under vacancies). 
 336 See Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena Six, Mass Incarceration, and the Remoralization of Civil 
Rights, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 477, 486 (2009) (“Because prison saps the limited economic and 
interpersonal resources of families with a loved one behind bars, both the families and the neighbor-
hood stay impoverished.” (quoting CLEAR, supra note 3, at 5)); Michael Pinard, An Integrated Per-
spective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by For-
merly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 659 (2006) (“[S]cholars have articulated the 
various ways in which criminal convictions can marginalize these individuals and constrain their eco-
nomic, legal, and social opportunities.”); Torin McFarland, Note, The Death Penalty vs. Life Incar-
ceration: A Financial Analysis, 7 SUSQUEHANNA U. POL. REV. 46, 46 (2016) (“Each death penalty 
inmate [costs] approximately $1.12 million (2015 USD) more than a general population inmate.”). 
 337 See Listokin, supra note 273, at 100–01 (discussing how statutes of limitations can be justified 
by the time point where prosecution costs more than its benefits yield). 
 338 Christian Mott, Statutes of Limitations and Personal Identity, in 2 OXFORD STUDIES IN EX-
PERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 243, 243–44 (Tania Lombrozo et al. eds., 2014). 
 339 See Constitutional Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 268, 277 (2003) (discussing how there is a point 
where “the fabric of community will have mended itself” after which society no longer requires pun-
ishment). 
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means, the result is the same under any disambiguation. One way to gauge re-
tributive interest could be to focus on the individual criminal and what that 
person deserves for her conduct. However, there is no theory of just deserts 
according to which they shrink with time.340 
A different way to gauge society’s retributive interest could be to focus on 
the people impacted by the crime. The keenness of their desire for retribution 
may become muted with time.341 The Model Penal Code endorses this ap-
proach: “as time goes by the retributive impulse which may have existed in the 
community is likely to yield place to a sense of compassion for the person 
prosecuted for an offense long forgotten.”342 Underlying this claim is a psycho-
logical hypothesis about retributive impulses. It is almost certainly wrong. The 
injuries victims suffer cannot always be forgotten; indeed, the injuries them-
selves may last indefinitely.343 Physical wounds mend, but they can leave life-
long scars behind. The emotional consequences can go deeper still.344 When 
the injury is still very present for the victim, it is hard to see her retributive 
impulse waning. 
A more sophisticated justification for statutes of limitations draws on be-
havioral economics to demonstrate that what diminishes with time is society’s 
deterrent interest, not its retributive interest. For an expected sanction to deter 
a potential criminal, it must exceed the benefits the criminal expects from 
committing the crime.345 On simple models, the expected sanction is just the 
magnitude of the sanction multiplied by the probability that the criminal will 
                                                                                                                 
 340 ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 295, at 60 (pointing out that retribution is needed even for 
long passed crimes, “however long it may take and however much it may cost”). 
 341 Constitutional Law, supra note 339, at 277 (“[C]riminal statutes of limitations may function to 
recognize that the wrong done to society has faded and that the most beneficial attitude in this instance 
is not vindictiveness but forgiveness.”). 
 342 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07, Tent. Draft No. 5, supra note 308, at cmt. 16. 
 343 David Viens, Note, Countdown to Injustice: The Irrational Application of Criminal Statutes of 
Limitations to Sexual Offenses Against Children, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 169, 169, 175–79 (2004) 
(“When these children reach adulthood they will suffer a myriad of dysfunctions, ranging from trou-
bled relationships, poor self-esteem, substance abuse and self-destructive behavior.”) 
 344 James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense Cases, 41 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1205, 1225–26 (2004) (“There is no statute of limitations on anguish. . . . [B]ecause the trauma 
suffered by victims can often last a lifetime, there should be no arbitrary time limit on seeking jus-
tice.” (footnote omitted)). 
 345 Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 
1538 (1998) (“Economic analysis of this question typically starts from the premise that potential of-
fenders will be deterred from criminal acts if the expected costs of those acts exceed their expected 
benefits.” (footnote omitted)); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1088 (2000) 
(“If criminals are rational utility maximizers, society can deter crime by raising these expected costs 
above the expected benefits of crime.”). 
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be caught and convicted.346 More advanced economic models recognize that 
people discount future value.347 For instance, having to pay five dollars in a 
year may be equivalent to paying two dollars now. Although the benefits of 
crime are often realized immediately, sanctions are imposed sometime later. As 
a result, a potential criminal’s future rate of discounting must be factored in 
when calculating the expected costs from criminal sanctions. Psychological 
research also suggests that criminals are “present-oriented,” meaning they have 
high future discount rates.348 When the prospect of an applicable penalty is far 
in the future, its present disvalue can become small enough that it cannot be an 
effective deterrent.349 Because imposing punishments is not costless to society, 
it is socially wasteful to sanction criminals that long after their misconduct.350 
This is a powerful argument for statutes of limitations. Yet it has three 
critical flaws. First, it focuses exclusively on the deliberations of individual 
criminals (specific deterrence) rather than criminals as a whole (general deter-
rence).351 As such, it significantly underestimates the social benefits of punish-
                                                                                                                 
 346 Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1062 (2001) 
(“[T]he expected sanction is a function of the probability of getting caught multiplied by the magni-
tude of the penalty . . . .”). 
 347 Howard Rachlin, Economics and Behavioral Psychology, in LIMITS TO ACTION: THE ALLO-
CATION OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 205, 208 (J.E.R. Staddon ed., 1980) (“Common sense, psycholo-
gy, and economics all offer the same answer. The value, positive or negative, of events at a later time 
is discounted in the present.”). 
 348 See MARK S. FLEISHER, BEGGARS AND THIEVES: LIVES OF URBAN STREET CRIMINALS 214 
(1995) (stating that “street culture” is focused on the now as opposed to the future); JAMES Q. WILSON 
& RICHARD HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 44–45 (1985) (explaining that although not 
committing crime has future benefits, many criminals commit a crime for the fast and easily discerni-
ble reward). As an aside, it is worth noting that this may not be particular to criminals; many non-
criminals (perhaps all of us) are very present-oriented. See EDWARD C. BANFIELD, Present Oriented-
ness and Crime, in HERE THE PEOPLE RULE: SELECTED ESSAYS 313, 313 (Edward C. Banfield ed., 2d 
ed. 1991) (“Since the seventeenth century, political philosophers have maintained that an irrational 
bias toward present as opposed to future satisfactions is natural to both men and animals . . . .”).  
 349 Listokin, supra note 273, at 100–01 (“Suppose, for example, that potential criminals care 
nothing for events and expenditures that take place more than 5 years from the present, while society 
values expenditures 5 years hence at some finite amount. This implies that punishment for a crime 
more than 5 years after its commission is inefficient from a deterrence perspective. The punishment 
has positive costs but achieves no deterrence.”). 
 350 Id. at 100 (“If criminals discount the future at a higher rate than society . . . and punishing 
crimes is costly for society, then, at times well after the commission of a crime, punishing a crime is 
inefficient from a deterrence perspective.”). As the parenthetical quote shows, Listokin’s argument is 
somewhat more sophisticated than I have presented; it considers society’s future discount rate too. 
The framework I have presented, however, captures the nuts and bolts and is enough to show the defi-
ciencies of the general approach. 
 351 General Deterrence, 1 BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (desk ed. 2012) (“General deterrence is 
the use of the threat of legal punishment not to punish the wrongdoer but to use the wrongdoer as an 
example to discourage others from similar conduct.”); Specific Deterrence (Personal Deterrence), 
BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY, supra (“Specific deterrence is the discouragement of an individual crim-
inal or tortfeasor from repeating the type of wrong that the wrongdoer is known to have done.”). 
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ing old crimes. Whereas threatening to punish a potential criminal at a future 
date may not effectively deter that individual, punishing her after that date 
nonetheless sends a message to other criminals about the consequences of 
crime.352 Other potential criminals cannot assume that they too will be sanc-
tioned only long after their crimes; for all they know, the state may catch them 
before the time at which their future discount rate would tilt the present-day 
cost-benefit analysis. Once the effects of general deterrence enter the picture, 
the argument for having statutes of limitations weakens under the economic 
model. 
There is another reason that the economic model cannot support statutes 
of limitations—it is equally an argument for increasing penalties. The parame-
ters of the model assume that limitations periods are variable while available 
sanctions remain fixed.353 But if the basic problem is that penalties are ineffec-
tive deterrents after the discount rate is applied over enough years, three eco-
nomic solutions are available. One is to have statutes of limitations, so that 
crimes must be punished, if at all, before discounting drives the present-day 
disvalue of the penalty down too far. Another solution is to raise the size of the 
penalty. A higher penalty would increase the time-period within which it could 
effectively deter. The most economically effective solution is a third approach: 
to have variable penalties354 that increase over time so that, even after they are 
discounted in light of their future application, they remain effective present-
day deterrents.355 There would be no need to time-bar any prosecutions, and all 
crime would be effectively deterred, even if the criminal expects to be able to 
evade justice for a long period of time. 
Finally, despite its claims to the contrary, the economic model also strug-
gles to explain why limitations periods should be longer for more serious 
                                                                                                                 
 352 See Zachary Hoskins, Deterrent Punishment and Respect for Persons, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
369, 373 (2011) (“In a system of punishment aimed at general deterrence, sentences are not imposed 
to inflict suffering on the offender, but rather to maintain a credible threat to the public generally.”). 
 353 Listokin, supra note 273, at 104 (“[T]he statute of limitations should be chosen by the same 
criterion used to choose any other tool of law enforcement—to minimize social costs. Raising the 
statute of limitations has both marginal benefits and marginal costs.”). 
 354 Some scholars have proposed variable penalties in other contexts, e.g. penalties that increase 
for any given crime in inverse proportion to the probability of the criminal getting caught. See, e.g., 
Nicole Hallett, The Problem of Wage Theft, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 113 (2018) (“If penalties 
are very low, then the probability of getting caught must be very high to encourage compliance. If 
enforcement rates are very low then penalties must be very severe to reach the same result.”). 
 355 This would be the opposite recommendation of another very interesting behavioral economics 
approach to statutes of limitations that argues for an “incremental approach,” according to which val-
ue of claims decreases over time. Wistrich, supra note 306, at 649. This is premised on the psycholo-
gy of how people relate to deadlines. Id. at 649–50. Regrettably, there is not space in one article to 
consider every argument that merits attention. 
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crimes.356 The period after which sanctions become ineffective is where future 
discounting would erode their present disvalue below the expected benefits of 
crime. The length of the limitations period, therefore, depends on the discount 
rate and the spread between the expected criminal gains and the actual criminal 
gains. The relative length of the efficient limitations periods for more serious 
crimes versus less serious crimes, therefore, depends on the spread for each. 
Without a reason to think the spread is greater for more serious crimes, there is 
no reason to conclude that limitations periods for serious crimes should be 
longer. In fact, so far as most optimal deterrence theorists are concerned, the 
spread should be the same (just shy of zero) regardless of how serious a crime 
is.357 
Some courts and commentators justify statutes of limitations in terms of a 
third social interest: promoting effective allocation of scarce enforcement re-
sources.358 These process arguments assume that investigating more recent 
crimes should be higher priority. Similar to the exclusionary rule in evidence, 
by barring prosecution of stale offenses, statutes of limitations incentivize the 
“allocation of enforcement resources . . . on recent wrongs.”359 
Even if this line of argument can support its assumption that recent 
wrongs should be a higher enforcement priority, it cannot explain why more 
serious crimes have longer limitations periods.360 The argument applies equally 
to misdemeanors as it does to felonies. If anything, there should be more ur-
gency to investigating and prosecuting more serious crimes. In that case, 
properly calibrating enforcement incentives would require limitations that vary 
inversely with seriousness—shorter limitations for felonies, and longer limita-
tions for misdemeanors. 
                                                                                                                 
 356 Listokin, supra note 273, at 105 (“Crimes that cause more harm should have a longer statute 
of limitations for prosecution.”). 
 357 PAUL ROBINSON ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 81 (2017) 
(“Punishment imposes costs on the state as well as on the person punished; accordingly, the punish-
ment should be set just high enough to maximize deterrence (or, more precisely, to achieve the effi-
cient rate of deterrence, where the net benefit of crime prevention relative to its cost is highest), but no 
higher.”). 
 358 See, e.g., Toussie, 397 U.S. at 114–15 (“Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals 
from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by 
the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-
distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement offi-
cials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.”). 
 359 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 278, at 281; see Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth 
Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 13 (2013) (“Traditionally, the exclusionary rule has successfully de-
terred police from violating privacy rights of both the guilty and innocent alike.”). 
 360 This Section reflects my skepticism. See supra notes 286–359 and accompanying text. 
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C. A New Rationale: Limiting Identity 
Scholars have struggled to make sense of even the first basic feature of 
statutes of limitations: “after a certain time, no quantum of evidence is suffi-
cient to convict.”361 Perhaps part of the problem is that commentators have 
been too willing to accept that “[t]he statute of limitations is clearly a nonex-
culpatory defense.”362 As a result, the justifications commentators offer “are 
not based on a lack of culpability of the defendant. They are purely public pol-
icy arguments.”363 Section I.B argued that these policy arguments fail to ac-
count for the most basic features of limitations periods. 
Perhaps scholars have been too hasty in their assumption that statutes of 
limitations are not about culpability. If the running of the limitations period 
could somehow undermine a criminal’s culpability, that would explain why 
“no quantum of evidence is sufficient to convict.” Innocence is the lone cir-
cumstance that everyone agrees takes conviction off the table. What may be 
needed, then, is a view according to which statutes of limitations serve as a 
doctrinal mechanism for establishing innocence. 
Accounting for statutes of limitations in terms of personal identity offers 
just that. The proposal defended here is: 
The Identity Limiting Account: Statutes of limitations are an implic-
it recognition that people’s criminal identities evolve over time.  
After enough time has passed, criminals’ identities can change enough that 
they become, so far as criminal law should be concerned, new people.364 “[I]f 
any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is that guilt is personal 
and not inheritable.”365 When Justice Jackson wrote that sentence in his dissent 
in Korematsu v. United States, he was referring to heritability from ances-
tors.366 It could equally apply to the guilt of any person from the past, even 
remote and non-identical past selves. A present-day person must be innocent—
so far as criminal law is concerned—of past crimes if enough time has elapsed 
for her criminal identity to change. 
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The identity limiting account can explain the prosecution-limiting feature 
of statutes of limitations from the perspective of all the major purposes of 
criminal justice: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.367 If 
as argued above, a person’s identity changes over time, retributivists should 
take note. Only by barring prosecution in such cases—as statutes of limitations 
do—can retributivists hope to punish people only when retributively appropri-
ate. Ignoring changes in identity guarantees that some innocent present-day 
people will be punished for the crimes of guilty past people. From this per-
spective, limitations periods should be tied to generalized observations of hu-
man psychology about how long it typically takes for identity to change. After 
that time passes, the risk that any indictment would run afoul of retributive 
interests becomes too great. Recent experimental studies about people’s ordi-
nary moral intuitions confirm this commonsense perspective.368 One study 
found an inverse relationship between people’s judgments about the appropri-
ateness of punishing criminals369 and the length of time between the commis-
sion of crime and its discovery.370 Participants in the study also read scenarios 
in which criminals underwent different changes after they committed their 
crimes but before being punished.371 “[J]udgments about the connectedness of 
the [present-day person to the past criminal he was] play a significant role” 
mediating judgments about how appropriate punishment would be.372 
There are also powerful deterrence-based arguments for statutes of limita-
tions on the identity limiting account.373 To see why, it is important first to re-
call the discussion about continuing offenses—offenses like conspiracy or wel-
fare fraud that can continue even after every element of the crime is satis-
fied.374 The limitations periods for these are tolled until the criminal conduct 
ceases.375 In general, all repeated offenses are treated that way. A criminal who 
commits a crime multiple times can be prosecuted for all instances assuming 
there was no gap between instances that exceeded the applicable limitations 
                                                                                                                 
 367 See Mott, supra note 338, at 266. 
 368 Id. at 248–49 (describing recent studies affirming that people look to identity connections 
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 370 Id. at 252. 
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period.376 The limitations period tolls until the most recent occurrence of the 
offense. The way the law tolls limitations periods for continuing or repeat of-
fenses makes sense on the identity limiting account. In such cases, a continued 
pattern of criminality is solid evidence of a sustained criminal disposition and, 
hence, a continued criminal identity. Conversely, a person who refrains from 
criminal conduct during the entire limitations period has a good claim to hav-
ing shed her criminal disposition and, as a result, undergone a change in her 
criminal identity.377 Limitations periods create a presumption that a relevant 
change in identity has taken place. The presumption can be overcome by a 
showing that the defendant continued the offense or repeated it during the rele-
vant period. 
These observations about continuing crimes help to show how statutes of 
limitations, on the identity limiting account, allocate criminal justice resources 
to achieve effective deterrence. Given what is known about recidivism, the 
best predictor of a person’s present-day disposition to criminality is a recent 
history of criminality.378 Three-quarters of inmates nation-wide reoffend within 
five years of release.379 Additionally, an exceedingly large number of criminals 
remain at large.380 Only about forty-five percent of violent crime is reported to 
police,381 and police clear only forty-six percent of reported cases.382 These 
striking figures suggest that one effective deterrent strategy is to target the in-
centives of people who have committed crime but are not yet in the criminal 
justice system. This is exactly what statutes of limitations do on the identity 
limiting account. They incentivize at-large criminals not to continue or repeat 
                                                                                                                 
 376 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 373 F.3d 561, 564, 568 (4th Cir. 2004) (ruling that the de-
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pdf [https://perma.cc/T7E8-ZU6Q] (providing statistics for the percentage of certain crimes that are 
reported to police). 
 381 Truman & Morgan, supra note 380, at 6. 
 382 Gramlich, supra note 380, at 6. 
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their crimes. In so doing, criminals build a claim to having shed their criminal 
dispositions and to having a changed criminal identity. In return, statutes of 
limitations eventually promise immunity from prosecution for past crimes. 
Insofar as it links prosecution to criminal disposition, the identity limiting 
account resonates with criminal law’s rehabilitative and incapacitative purpos-
es. A rehabilitated criminal is one who has shed her criminal disposition, i.e. 
has undergone a change in criminal identity. As explained, statutes of limita-
tions can incentivize criminals to self-rehabilitate, which removes the need for 
the law to rehabilitate or incapacitate.383 Although criminals can engage in pro-
jects of self-change, the natural course of time—and all the personal growth 
and development it brings—can do the same.384 This can explain why statutes 
of limitations are tied to time periods rather than personal effort. Although 
commentators have tended to balk at seeing rehabilitation as a justification for 
statutes of limitations, that purpose meshes well with the identity limiting ac-
count.385 
So far, this Section has shown that the identity limiting account offers a 
justifying explanation of the first basic feature of statutes of limitations—that 
they prohibit prosecution after a period.386 The account can also provide an 
elegant explanation of the second basic feature of statutes of limitations—that 
more serious crimes have longer limitations periods.387 The explanation pro-
ceeds from two observations. The first is that more serious crimes tend to re-
flect deeper-rooted anti-social character traits.388 The second is that such traits 
generally take longer to change than the more superficial traits that drive peo-
ple to commit less serious violations. If true, these two general observations 
imply that the criminal identity of someone who commits a more serious crime 
should generally take longer to change. So, it makes sense on the identity lim-
iting account to have longer statutes of limitations for more serious crimes. 
The first observation—that serious violations reflect deeper-rooted crimi-
nal identities—is best demonstrated by example. Contrast the misdemeanor of 
simple trespass, which includes “[e]ntering upon . . . property without the ex-
                                                                                                                 
 383 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07, Tent. Draft No. 5, supra note 308, at cmt. 16 (stating that reha-
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press permission of the owner . . . to . . . fish,” with the felony of burglary in 
the first degree, which includes “having the intent to commit a [listed felony] 
. . . [and] break[ing] an occupied structure” while “ha[ving] possession of a 
dangerous weapon.”389 The former is punishable by up to thirty days in jail, a 
fine up to $625, or both; the latter by up to twenty-five years in prison.390 
Though both crimes involve entering on someone else’s property, the signifi-
cant difference in punishment reflects the fact that burglary is a more serious 
crime. This makes sense because the potential for personal injury during a bur-
glary is much higher.391 Additionally, the interests of the victim that a burglar 
violates—to be secure in body and home—are greater than the interests that 
simple trespass violates—to exclude others from land and stream.392 
The higher stakes involved in burglary also show why burglary must gen-
erally reflect a criminal’s deeper criminal disposition. The network of inter-
connecting commitments, values, and personality traits that allow burglars to 
set aside victims’ salient claims to security and integrity must be psychologi-
cally more encompassing. They must also be more deeply ingrained for the 
burglar to be willing to risk the considerably greater punishment to carry out 
the criminal enterprise. Although many people could imagine a relative who is 
passionate about fishing engaging in casual trespass, there is nothing casual 
about first-degree burglary. Psychologists have recognized that burglars have 
distinctive motivations, behaviors, and decision-making.393 There is no re-
search program into the psychology of simple trespass. 
The second observation—that deeper-rooted traits take longer to 
change—follows from the fact that personal identities change gradually and 
incrementally. Abrupt identity changes are possible if brought about by brain 
damage or radical conversion experiences.394 The ordinary and general case, 
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however, happens subtly over time.395 People rarely wake up feeling as though 
they underwent a dramatic break in identity from the person they were yester-
day. This feeling, when it occurs repeatedly, may be symptomatic of a mental 
condition called “depersonalization/derealization disorder.”396 It is probably 
for this reason that the psychologists studying healthy identity change consider 
periods spanning years.397 If normal identity change is gradual, it must proceed 
by way of accumulated changes to more surface level psychological traits. 
Changes to deep traits requiring more pervasive shifts of attitude and behavior 
can be the eventual result—but it takes time. Therefore, to the extent that more 
serious crimes reflect deeper rooted criminal character traits and dispositions, 
the criminal identities of those who commit serious crimes should generally 
take longer to change. 
D. Objections 
The identity limiting account can explain the two basic features of stat-
utes of limitations. Because criminal identity naturally changes over time, stat-
utes of limitations bar prosecution that would risk conviction of a now-
changed individual. Also, because more serious crimes reflect more deeply 
rooted criminal identities that are slower to change, longer limitations periods 
are appropriate. 
Beyond these two basic features, statutes of limitations in the United 
States have other features that may initially strike some readers as inconsistent 
with the identity limiting account. Indeed, the features discussed below strike 
many commentators as inconsistent with any possible account of statutes of 
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limitations. The identity limiting account can instead explain and embrace 
them. 
For example, as one commentator has opined, the “problem with statutes 
of limitations . . . [is] that they paint with the broad brush of an inflexible gen-
eral rule.”398 The rule-like nature of limitations periods may seem to conflict 
with the identity limiting account. Identity shifts gradually and organically. 
There is usually no single moment when it can be said that a person’s criminal 
identity has changed. Identity can also change at different rates for different 
people and at different rates during different phases of the same person’s 
life.399 
Judges are also suspicious of statutes of limitations’ rule-like nature. As 
Judge Posner explained, “how can you reason to 3 years over 2,300 days over 
240, 20 years over 15? You cannot . . . .”400 His question applies equally to 
questions of identity as it would to spoliation of evidence or the right of re-
pose. Bright-line rules are necessarily “overinclusive and underinclusive if as-
sessed by reference to their purposes.”401 As the Supreme Court has observed, 
statutes of limitations “are by definition arbitrary.”402 In an ideal world, stat-
utes of limitations are effectively implemented and flexibly keyed to their pur-
pose. Some commentators have proposed multi-factor balancing tests to re-
place determinate limitations periods.403 A more provocative proposal would 
abandon limitations periods altogether, and instead adjust punishments to re-
flect the shifting balance between society’s and the defendant’s interests.404 
The identity limiting account sympathizes with these criticisms of the ri-
gidity of statutes of limitations. The account does not rule out the use of multi-
factor standards or innovations in punishment as possible solutions. The identi-
ty limiting account would, however, call for extreme caution before moving 
away from a rule-based regime. The proponents of more flexible standards 
tend to assume that these would lead to more accurate results. They seem to 
trust that judges or prosecutors would dispassionately weigh various factors 
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and determine precisely when they tip one way or the other.405 Yet even those 
who advocate for these approaches concede “[t]here is no science for calculat-
ing the precise duration that most fairly balances the relevantly competing in-
terests for each crime, nor is it even clear that such a duration exists.”406 
If personal identity were readily observable, case-by-case determinations 
of identity between present-day defendants and past criminals might enhance 
accuracy. A person’s identity, however, arises from unobservable psychological 
traits that must be inferred, if at all, using circumstantial evidence.407 Even 
when these traits can be inferred accurately, the vague boundaries between one 
identity and the next make line drawing impossible.408 In such circumstances, 
it is an open question whether a rule or a standard would generate more con-
sistent and appropriate results.409 An open-ended standard would risk provid-
ing cover for judges and prosecutors to make idiosyncratic, or even biased, 
determinations about when a criminal has changed enough.410 Having legisla-
tures promulgate bright-line rules premised on general observations about hu-
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man psychological development likely produces greater overall accuracy and 
fairness.411 
This leads to a second objection to the identity limiting account. Legisla-
tures have created bright-line limitations periods, but they have often opted for 
quite short time frames. For misdemeanors, statutes of limitations generally 
range from one to three years.412 Short periods may seem to strain the credibil-
ity of the proposal that statutes of limitations are premised on identity 
change.413 Can someone really change their criminal identity in so little time? 
It is important to recall the relatively restricted notion of identity that is at 
the heart of the identity limiting account. The account does not justify statutes 
of limitations by providing that a person’s identity can change over a year’s 
time in some holistic, all-encompassing sense. Not only is that undoubtedly 
false, it is questionable whether any holistic concept of identity even makes 
sense.414 Rather, as argued above, it is preferable to speak of people’s identi-
ties, where each is characterized by reference to a relative network of inter-
ests.415 The identity limiting account does not impute to criminal law the ab-
surd view that people’s identities routinely change tout court every one to three 
years. Rather, it is people’s identities relative to the interests of criminal law, 
i.e. their criminal identities, that change. This notion of identity is determined 
by whatever psychological traits disposed a person to commit the crime in 
question.416 For misdemeanors, it is more plausible that people can lose and 
acquire these dispositions over relatively short periods of time. To the extent 
they cannot, limitations periods should be longer. 
A final common objection to statutes of limitations is that it makes little 
sense to bar prosecution of someone who committed a crime if that person is 
not contrite.417 Scholars who make this objection tend to view statutes of limi-
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tations as a forgiveness that the state extends to criminals.418 If a criminal’s 
perception of the criminal act and its victims does not change, forgiveness and 
absolution do not seem appropriate. 
Although the identity limiting account may seem subject to the same ob-
jection, it has a ready response. It does not require (as the law does not) contri-
tion. The reason is straightforward: “[g]enuine repentance, as well as such 
states as contrition, remorse, the feeling of guilt, and the desire for atonement, 
all require some sense of continuity with the past and self-identity with an ear-
lier wrongdoer.”419 If, as the identity limiting account proposes, criminal iden-
tity changes in relevant respects over the limitations period, a person may lack 
the continuity of self required for forgiveness. A person whose identity has 
changed may feel regret for past wrongs. Perhaps society should demand that. 
Regret is the appropriate response to any harm that befalls an innocent person, 
regardless of who brought the harm about. But it is a conceptual mistake to 
demand that a person feel guilt or contrition when that person is not (i.e. is no 
longer) identifiable as the wrongdoer.420 
III. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR LIMITING IDENTITY IN CRIMINAL LAW 
This Article has argued that criminal law should care about diachronic 
criminal identity. Only then could the law assure that the present-day people it 
targets are those who deserve punishment for past criminal acts. If the account 
of statutes of limitations in the previous Part is correct, then criminal law al-
ready has some commitments to something like the theory of diachronic crimi-
nal identity offered in Part I. Criminal law, however, has failed to embrace the 
broader implications of personal identity. The justice system routinely over-
prosecutes and over-punishes by holding people accountable for crimes that 
their non-identical past selves committed. This Part draws attention to several 
core areas of criminal law where this happens and proposes concrete reforms 
that better align the requirements of the identity principle with the limits of 
personal identity. 
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A. Limiting Prosecution 
Indicting anyone for a crime committed one hundred and twenty years 
ago would be inappropriate. It would of necessity involve indicting the wrong 
person because the natural lifespan of a human being is less than one hundred 
and twenty years. Under the same logic, if people’s identities naturally change 
over time, prosecution for crimes that occurred before the period within which 
identities ordinarily change should also be inappropriate. Part II argued that 
statutes of limitations are one way the law recognizes this. But statutes of limi-
tations do the job imperfectly. As one obvious example, some of the most seri-
ous crimes in every jurisdiction, most notably murder, have no statute of limi-
tations.421 If identities can change, this policy violates the identity principle. 
Innocent people should not be at serious risk of indictment, even for, and per-
haps especially for, the most serious offenses. The identity principle should 
require time limits on prosecuting any crime. 
This Section considers other respects in which a psychologically and 
philosophically informed approach to personal identity would constrain prose-
cution for past crimes. 
1. Young Offenders 
Prosecution policy should be keyed to the best psychological data about 
how identity changes. A growing body of research suggests that personal iden-
tity changes at different rates with age. If that is right, it holds implications 
both for statutes of limitations as applied to young offenders and for the juve-
nile justice system. 
Human psychology changes very rapidly during the earlier stages of life. 
Some of this is due to the natural maturation of basic cognitive reasoning ca-
pacities. Psychologists once thought that these capacities reached near comple-
tion in mid-adolescence.422 They now know that it takes many more years be-
fore these cognitive capacities reach adulthood.423 Teens continue to be vulner-
able to judgment-distorting influences like peer orientation, misperception of 
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risk, and deficient self-management.424 Current brain science shows significant 
signs of adolescence and development until well into the twenties.425 
Additionally, young people have a relatively fluid relationship with per-
sonal identity. During the pre-teen years—“characterized by exploration, ex-
perimentation, and fluctuations in self-image”—it may be said that people do 
not have fully coherent personal identities at all.426 Psychologists describe a 
predictable developmental sequence from “identity crisis” toward greater self-
definition.427 Both superficial identity elements—like dress and speech man-
ner—and deeper elements—like personality and values—are in flux.428 It is 
not until early adulthood that there is “coherent integration of the various re-
tained elements of identity.”429 In a very real sense, “[a]dolescents are not yet 
the persons they will become.”430 
Identity development never ceases: the persons adolescents will become 
are not the persons they will remain.431 The process of self-definition and re-
definition lasts a lifetime. Youth, adulthood, and old age, however, mark points 
on a spectrum of the rate of change. As a person ages, her preferences, values, 
and personalities stabilize.432 As a result, people in their middle years change 
identity faster than seniors, people in their twenties change identity faster still, 
and teenagers’ newly formed identities change fastest of all.433 
This variance in the rate of identity change should inform how the law 
approaches statutes of limitations. On the identity limiting account, statutes of 
limitations serve as an implicit recognition that personal identity changes, and 
that it is improper to prosecute a person with a different identity than the crim-
inal. Currently, fixed limitations periods apply across the board to all offenders 
regardless of age. In Iowa, for example, the statute of limitations for most fel-
onies is three years; that period applies “[i]n all cases.”434 A more defensible 
approach would key limitations periods to a person’s age at the time of of-
fense—shorter periods for younger criminals, longer for older. This would help 
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limitations periods keep pace with observable generalizations about how iden-
tity actually changes, rather than insisting that it changes at a fixed rate from 
birth to death. 
The unique personal identity characteristics of young offenders should al-
so inform how the juvenile justice system functions. The system is currently 
caught between two framing conceits.435 In the 1940s, every state had inde-
pendent juvenile court systems, with special child-protective rules of proce-
dure and a focus on reform and reintegration.436 “The juvenile court’s rehabili-
tative ideal rested on several assumptions about positive criminology, chil-
dren’s malleability, and the availability of effective intervention strategies to 
act in the child’s ‘best interests.’”437 During the 1980s and 1990s, however, 
rates of juvenile crime increased rapidly,438 leading to a series of high-profile 
tragedies.439 These developments motivated a more retributivist mentality to-
ward juvenile crime. Laws created several exceptions under which juveniles 
who committed serious violent crimes could qualify for prosecution as adults. 
Scholars who criticize the retributive shift in juvenile justice contend that 
“it is [always] inappropriate to hold adolescents to an adult standard of ac-
countability.”440 The Supreme Court has endorsed this view: 
[L]ess culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile 
than to a comparable crime committed by an adult, since inexperi-
ence, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less 
able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the 
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same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emo-
tion or peer pressure than is an adult.441 
This perspective—that juveniles are less developed and therefore less respon-
sible—may justify reinvigorating the firm line separating the juvenile justice 
system. As its proponents point out, the factors that currently qualify a juvenile 
offender for treatment as an adult under the law have no bearing on whether 
children have crossed developmental hurdles necessary for true responsibil-
ity.442 The perspective suffers, however, from two critical shortcomings. One is 
that it fails to acknowledge the politically powerful and widespread “assump-
tion that young offenders . . . are fully responsible.”443 This may limit its pro-
spects for success. The second shortcoming is that it has unpalatable implica-
tions for the accountability of adult criminals. If impulsivity and susceptibility 
to peer pressure mitigate teen responsibility, why not for adults too? 
Framing the justification for a separate juvenile criminal justice system in 
terms of personal identity can show the necessity of reform while also speak-
ing to the insights of both the earlier (rehabilitative) and current (retributive) 
approaches.444 Some scholars have dismissed personal identity as an available 
lens for theorizing juvenile criminal justice.445 Bucking that trend, Elizabeth S. 
Scott and Laurence Steinberg have pioneered work on juvenile identity and 
criminal justice.446 They are character theorists and view people as responsible 
for misconduct when their behavior manifests defective character.447 Juveniles 
should have a separate justice system because, according to Scott and Stein-
berg, adolescent behavior “does not manifest ‘character’ at all.”448 “Youthful 
involvement in crime is often a part of [exploration and experimentation] and, 
as such, it reflects the values and preferences of a transitory stage, rather than 
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those of an individual with a settled identity.”449 If a juvenile’s behavior has no 
connection to character, she cannot be accountable on a character theoretic ap-
proach to punishment. Although there is much to recommend from Scott’s and 
Steinberg’s work, it fails to acknowledge the strong feeling many people have 
(including juveniles themselves) that teenagers are capable of responsible ac-
tion. Their work is also in tension with the general view that juveniles are in-
dependent loci of dignity.450 A person’s capacity for responsible action is part 
and parcel with their status as beings worthy of respect.451 
The proposition advanced here is that juveniles may be fully capable of 
having identities, but that juvenile identity changes much more quickly than it 
will later in life. This approach speaks to retributive sensibilities and respects 
the dignity that juveniles possess. Middle and late adolescents are people who 
have identities and may even be able act responsibly. But given how rapidly 
their identities change, it makes sense to have an adjudicatory and sentencing 
process tailored to them. Courts, judges, and prosecutors attuned to this fact 
can help limit the consequences of conviction so that its effects are less likely 
to outlast the transience of young identity.452 
The approach to criminal identity offered here also suggests that the law 
may be drawing the wrong line between juveniles and adults. Depending on 
the jurisdiction, one becomes an adult for criminal law purposes at sixteen,453 
seventeen,454 or eighteen.455 A person’s criminal identity, as defined in Part I, is 
tied to characterological traits that dispose her to engage in criminal conduct. 
The most reliable way to track generalities of how criminal identity develops 
over the human life cycle is to look at statistics relating age and rates of mis-
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conduct. These can show when criminal dispositions are most likely to devel-
op, and, as importantly, when people who have acquired those dispositions are 
most likely to lose them. 
“It is now a truism that age is one of the strongest factors associated with 
criminal behavior.”456 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) keeps statis-
tics on arrest rates for different age groups across all major crime categories.457 
An almost law-like relationship emerges from the most recent data. It suggests 
that current juvenile justice policy of treating juveniles who commit more seri-
ous crimes as adults is exactly backwards. 
For property crimes, as illustrated in the graph below, eighteen seems to 
be the right approximate age of majority so far as criminal identity is con-
cerned.458 
 
The inflection point between fifteen and nineteen shows that this range of ages 
is where criminal disposition is most likely to develop and after which it is 
most likely to be lost.459 On the theory of diachronic criminal identity devel-
oped in Part I, this means that the criminal justice system should anticipate a 
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rapid change in criminal identity after the late teen years so far as property 
crimes are concerned. 
It is different, however, for more serious crimes like murder and aggra-
vated assault.460 Judges and prosecutors often have the discretion to treat juve-
niles who commit serious crimes as adults.461 Presumably, the thought is that 
juveniles who commit such crimes must, despite their youth, already be “hard-
ened criminals.”462 Statistics on the incidence of these serious crimes, as illus-
trated in the graph below, suggest that the age of adulthood, so far as criminal 
identity is concerned, is later rather than earlier.463 
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The inflexion point for these violent crimes occurs after twenty.464 This sug-
gests that the more appropriate age of majority, bearing in mind the rates at 
which criminal identity changes, is closer to the mid-twenties than to eighteen. 
For violent crimes and any others that share similar age-of-commission charac-
teristics, the presumptive age of adulthood should be several years later than it 
currently is. 
Such “age-crime curves” would strike most criminologists as quaint.465 
For centuries, they have known that criminal involvement peaks around early 
adulthood and then declines with age.466 Though generalized statistics fail to 
capture individual variations, the curve is a predictable reverse-U.467 Scholars 
working on life-course criminology point to different variables that might ex-
plain the decline in criminal activity after early adulthood.468 These include 
both biological changes, like brain developments relating to emotional maturi-
ty469 and physical decline,470 and social changes like finding legitimate em-
ployment471 and marriage.472 Whatever variables are at play, when they pro-
duce a shift in criminal identity at predictable age markers, the law should take 
notice. 
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2. Statutes of Repose 
Statutes of limitations are subject to an increasing number of exceptions, 
called tolling provisions, which allow prosecutors to bring charges that the lim-
itations period would otherwise bar. As discussed in Part II with respect to con-
tinuing offenses, some tolling provisions are consistent with recognizing that 
people’s identities change.473 Considerations of personal identity, however, 
should prompt a reevaluation of other tolling provisions to ensure they do not 
violate the identity principle. As a general rule, statutes of limitations should 
evolve to look more like statutes of repose, which are not subject to most 
forms of tolling.474 “Like a discharge in bankruptcy, a statute of repose can be 
said to provide a fresh start or freedom from liability. . . . [I]t in part embodies 
the idea that at some point a defendant should be able to put past events behind 
him.”475 
Tolling provisions that extend limitations periods without any reference to 
intervening activity are immediately suspect. For example, some states apply a 
discovery rule to certain crimes, like fraud, according to which the limitations 
period only begins to run once the offense is discovered.476 Several states also 
retroactively toll statutes of limitations until any point in time that inculpating 
DNA evidence is discovered.477 The motivations behind these exceptions are 
laudatory. Fraud, by its nature, is easily concealed.478 This means that limita-
tions periods ordinarily used for crimes of similar seriousness will often run 
out before fraud comes to light. DNA evidence, unlike witness memories or 
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paper documents, does not spoil with time and remains solid proof of physical 
contact,479 even decades later.480 
These rationales, however, are irreconcilable with any rationale that fo-
cuses on fairness to the defendant or social welfare.481 They are even harder to 
justify on the identity limiting account. Discovery of the offense or DNA evi-
dence can have no bearing on whether the offender or the owner of the genome 
remains the same person. 
For a very limited class of crimes, tolling until discovery, or even abolish-
ing statutes of limitations entirely, might make sense. These are crimes whose 
very commission shows that the offender has a durable criminal identity that is 
unlikely to change with the passage of time. Although, as a general rule, crimi-
nal identities change with time, the best psychological understanding of some 
criminal dispositions is that they last a lifetime. The disposition to commit 
sexual offenses against minors is one such example.482 Most states have effec-
tively removed statutes of limitations for such offenses.483 One common justi-
fication is that the effects of sexual abuse on victims never go away.484 Addi-
tionally, child victims often repress memories of their abuse only to find that 
the limitations period has passed by the time the memories resurface.485 Lead-
ing commentators have argued that extending statutes of limitations for child 
sex abuse “are particularly difficult to square with the rule’s fairness- and effi-
ciency-promoting purposes.”486 On the identity limiting account, however, it 
may make a lot of sense. Psychologists now understand that pedophilia is a 
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“sexual orientation[] . . . unlikely to change.”487 Even pedophiles who seek 
help for their condition will find that there is no effective treatment.488 As such, 
sexual abuse of a child manifests a criminal disposition—a criminal identity—
that is likely to outlast any limitations period.489 In such cases, imposing any 
limitations period would conflict with current science establishing the un-
changeability of pedophilic criminal identity. 
B. Limiting Punishment 
The stigma and burden of prosecution is not the only effect that the crimi-
nal justice system can have on defendants long after a crime occurred.490 If 
criminal law is to take seriously the possibility that personal identity can 
change over time, then it must consider that other prolonged effects may im-
pact the wrong people. These include long-term prison sentences and enduring 
collateral consequences of conviction. 
1. Prison Terms 
There are more than 160,000 people presently serving life sentences in 
the United States.491 An additional 44,000 are serving “virtual life sentences” 
of fifty years or more.492 The number of life sentences has been growing rapid-
                                                                                                                 
 487 Pessimism About Pedophilia, supra note 482.  
 488 Alice Dreger, What Can Be Done About Pedophilia?, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2013), https://
www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/08/what-can-be-done-about-pedophilia/279024/ 
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§ 13.2(a)(3) (“[The decision not to prosecute can] relieve deserving defendants of even the stigma of 
prosecution.”). 
 491 Nellis, supra note 31, at 5.  
 492 Id. 
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ly and currently stands at four times what it was in 1984.493 This is part of a 
broader trend across all states of imposing longer prison sentences, which have 
increased on average by five years since 2000.494 Of inmates serving life sen-
tences, nearly a third have no possibility of parole.495 More than ten-thousand 
inmates serving life sentences were convicted while juveniles. Of these, a 
quarter serve without the possibility of parole.496 
If personal identity ordinarily changes, judges should impose life sentenc-
es much more rarely. There is no reason to suppose that the natural processes 
by which personal identity changes cease behind bars. Life sentences unjustifi-
ably risk eventually imprisoning people who are innocent, even if their earlier 
counterparts were guilty. Just as statutes of limitations limit prosecutions that 
bear too great a risk of targeting a person with a now-changed identity, formal 
limits on prison terms should be in place to limit the risk of incarcerating now-
changed inmates. The risk is particularly high for individuals starting life sen-
tences as juveniles, when identities change at a rapid pace. Just as statutes of 
limitations should be shorter the younger an offender is, caps on prison sen-
tences should also be shorter for younger convicts.497 Several countries already 
have across-the-board limits on prison terms.498 Norway, for example, does not 
impose prison sentences longer than twenty-one years.499 The country also has 
“some of the lowest crime and recidivism rates” in the world.500 
Norway, of course, is not the United States. A more nuanced approach to 
limiting sentences may better accommodate both the concerns about identity 
change and the considerations that sometimes justify lengthy sentences here. 
                                                                                                                 
 493 Niall McCarthy, Report: The Number of People Serving Life Sentences in the U.S. Is Surging, 
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 494 The Hidden History of Rising Time Served, URB. INST. (July 2017), http://apps.urban.org/
features/long-prison-terms/trends.html [https://perma.cc/A9FN-DQFB]. 
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(2012), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Life%20Goes%20On%202013.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K646-8GE6]. 
 497 See supra notes 422−472 and accompanying text. 
 498 Maximum Length of Sentence, NATION MASTER (2019), https://www.nationmaster.com/
country-info/stats/Crime/Punishment/Maximum-length-of-sentence [https://perma.cc/9SA2-4VPC]. 
 499 Bryan Lufkin, The Myth Behind Long Prison Sentences, BBC (May 15, 2018), http://www.
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These considerations should not be ignored. In the 1970s and 1980s, both vio-
lent and property crime rates skyrocketed in the United States.501 During that 
time, average prison sentences tripled,502 in large part because courts and legis-
lators wanted to get “tough on crime.”503 This coincided with a broad shift in 
penal philosophy from the goal of rehabilitation to an emphasis on retribu-
tion.504 Today “9 in 10 people serving the longest prison terms were convicted 
of a violent offense.”505 Though life sentences may have little deterrent value, 
releasing violent inmates convicted of violent crimes risks shortchanging the 
interests of retributive justice and exposing society to still-dangerous individu-
als.506 
A more moderate approach to sentencing reform is to keep life sentences 
but require the possibility of parole in every instance. Retaining the possibility 
of parole would require routine review of whether inmates’ criminal identities 
have changed at periodic intervals.507 Of course, as with any parole decision, 
there is the risk of an error that returns a dangerous person back to the 
streets.508 This risk can be mitigated with more demanding standards of review 
by parole boards509 and tighter parole conditions to restrict and monitor parol-
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ees.510 The rest of the world uses life-without-parole sentences far less often 
and seems none the worse for it.511 
The Supreme Court has already shown some sympathy to this proposal 
when it comes to juvenile sentencing. In 2012, the Court ruled that statutes 
mandating sentences of life without parole violate the Eighth Amendment 
when applied to juveniles.512 The Court then extended the ruling by proscrib-
ing life without parole for all juveniles except those “whose crimes reflect ir-
reparable corruption.”513 Although application of that standard may not live up 
to its promise, it suggests that only juveniles whose criminal identities will 
never change should be irredeemably locked away for life. Given what psy-
chologists now know about the rapid pace of identity change during the juve-
nile years, the “irreparably corrupt” juvenile should be very rare. 
One unavoidable consequence of reducing prison sentences (whether by 
imposing sentencing caps or requiring the possibility of parole) is that victims 
will sometimes feel that justice has not been done.514 Unlike other sentencing 
reform proposals that couch justifications in broader policy rationales, an ac-
count focused on personal identity has a principled response.515 At times, cir-
cumstances arise that necessarily frustrate victims’ interests in retribution—for 
example, the criminal may die in an accident before apprehension.516 Although 
this may be a loss for victims hoping for justice, nabbing a lookalike scapegoat 
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that he deserves to die in a certain way: at the hands of the state—that is, at the hands of us.”). 
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to satisfy their psychological needs is unquestionably off the table. Analogous-
ly, if inmates’ personal identities really can change, then continuing to punish 
someone who has changed is no different from punishing an innocent looka-
like. “It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suf-
fer.”517 In an ideal world, everyone’s moral interests would be satisfied. But 
where natural changes bring the identity principle and victims’ psychic satis-
faction into conflict, the identity principle must prevail. 
2. Collateral Consequences 
Formal punishment is not the only state-imposed burden of criminal con-
viction. The various collateral consequences that accompany many convictions 
endure long past the payment of any fine or release from prison. “There are 
approximately 48,000 laws and rules in U.S. jurisdictions that restrict opportu-
nities and benefits based on criminal convictions.”518 These include519 ineligi-
bility for welfare benefits,520 public housing,521 or jury service,522 exclusion 
from professional licensing and other work opportunities,523 and disenfran-
chisement.524 The scope and effect of collateral consequences expanded dra-
matically during the 1980s and 1990s as part of the tough-on-crime move-
ment.525 At present, “U.S. policies on collateral consequences are harsher and 
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more permanent than those in other countries.”526 The law does not classify 
these collateral consequences as “punishment,”527 but they often have similar 
effects. In practice, collateral consequences thwart criminal justice goals by 
serving as barriers to felons’ social reintegration and by promoting recidi-
vism.528 
Collateral consequences can be long lasting. Eleven states disenfranchise 
felons even after they have completed their sentences.529 As a result, around 
6.1 million people are presently disenfranchised in the United States, including 
one in thirteen African Americans nationwide.530 In four states among those 
that allow post-sentence-completion disenfranchisement—Florida (until re-
cently), Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia—one in five African Americans 
cannot vote.531 Equally worrisome are the professional consequences of having 
a felony record.532 Few states have mechanisms for expunging or sealing adult 
convictions, and those mechanisms that are available are “generally inaccessi-
ble and unreliable.”533 Absent a presidential pardon, a federal criminal convic-
tion will haunt a former felon to her grave.534 
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While other scholars have advanced dignity and race-based criticisms of 
collateral consequences,535 these effects of conviction are also highly suspect 
from a personal identity perspective. If criminal law is to take seriously the 
possibility that personal identity changes with time, it can have no justification 
for automatically burdening people because of crimes long ago. Unlike the 
decision about whether to parole an inmate who is serving a life sentence, 
many of the felons at issue here have already served their sentences and been 
released to society. With few exceptions, when a former felon’s criminal iden-
tity has changed, enduring collateral consequences can serve no legitimate 
criminal justice interest. 
The most straightforward approach for reform would be to place hard ex-
piration dates on collateral consequences. Applicable timeframes could differ 
by crime and collateral consequence. Floridians, for example, recently passed 
Amendment 4, which will return voting rights to felons immediately upon 
completion of their sentence.536 Similar measures should be adopted for other 
collateral consequences that are not “closely related to the offense conduct in-
volved”537 nor designed to protect the public therefrom.538 
Just as statutes of limitations serve as a time horizon after which a person 
(presumed to have a changed identity) cannot be prosecuted for a past crime, 
similar limitations periods should apply automatically to expunge past crimes 
from people’s records. England’s Rehabilitation of Offenders Act erases crimi-
nal records after a set period without reoffense.539 According to that Act, after 
expungement, offenders “shall be treated for all purposes in law as a person 
who has not committed . . . the [subject] offence.”540 The United States should 
adopt a similar stance. 
As discussed above, there are some criminal identities—like those that 
lead to sexual offenses against children—that are unlikely ever to change.541 In 
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these cases, “the focus is on protecting children.”542 Tailor-made collateral 
consequences—like sex offender registration543 and prohibitions on working at 
childcare facilities544—should have no time horizon for those convicted of 
sexual offenses against children. For highly durable criminal identities, there is 
no concern that such provisions violate the identity principle. 
C. Limiting Death Row 
According to the latest available statistics, there are over 2,814 inmates 
currently on death row.545 In 2013, the last year the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
compiled data about how long these inmates spend on death row, the average 
wait was fifteen and a half years.546 Forty percent of all death row inmates 
have been there more than twenty years.547 If, as suggested above, the age of 
adulthood for violent criminals is closer to twenty-five than eighteen, most 
inmates on death row have spent their entire adult lives there.548 Many of the 
rest are much older and stand a better chance of dying in prison from natural 
causes than being executed.549 The long wait across different life stages force-
fully raises the concern that there are many inmates awaiting death whose 
criminal identities have changed. 
This is far from the first Article to criticize excessive delays on death row. 
Nearly a quarter century ago, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote his famous 
Lackey memo on the issue.550 The dominant concern among courts and schol-
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ars has been whether such delays are cruel and unusual. One thread has fo-
cused on whether the delay is itself a form of unacceptable punishment.551 As 
the Supreme Court wrote more than a century ago: “when a prisoner sentenced 
by a court to death is confined in the penitentiary awaiting the execution of the 
sentence, one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be subjected during 
that time is the uncertainty during the whole of it.”552 Justice Breyer has re-
peatedly shown his sympathy with this argument, including most recently in 
Vernon Madison’s case.553 A second critical thread observes that long delays 
bring old age, and old age brings mental decline that, similar to some mental 
disorders, can undermine the penological goals of execution.554 This is the ar-
gument Madison is now pursuing.555 
The only legal argument that Madison and any similarly situated death 
row inmate can presently make is that their execution would offend “evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”556 This 
Eighth Amendment argument necessarily tethers itself to the present expecta-
tions of society about whether executing someone like Madison would serve 
“the objective of community vindication.”557 To gauge that, the courts look to 
“objective indicia that reflect the public attitude,”558 such as “legislation enact-
ed by the country’s legislatures.”559 These sources, however, do not support 
Madison’s case if he can otherwise understand that the state now wants to pun-
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 555 Madison v. Alabama (Madison I), 139 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2019) (“[W]e must return this case to 
the state court for renewed consideration of Madison’s competency [due to his dementia].”); Brief of 
Petitioner, supra note 13, at 17. 
 556 Ford, 477 U.S. at 406 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 557 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007). 
 558 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). 
 559 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002). 
2019] Limiting Identity in Criminal Law 2095 
ish him for a past crime they say he committed.560 Under the Court’s present 
approach, a death row inmate must show that he is “incompetent”561 and can-
not “rationally comprehend the concepts of crime and punishment as applied in 
his case.”562 
Inmates who, like Madison, have undergone a break in personal identity 
are a poor fit for the Court’s analytic framework. They have a third-personal 
understanding of the concepts of crime and punishment. They can see them-
selves from the outside as players in a state narrative in which they find them-
selves in the role of criminal, convict, and condemned.563 But that narrative 
does not make sense to them when reconstructed first-personally. Because 
there has been a break in identity, it must seem as though a different man 
committed the crime. Madison may understand the parable of crime and pun-
ishment and that the state now asks him to fill the actor’s shoes so the story 
may draw to a close. Even though he finds that the shoes do not fit, that is not 
enough for Eighth Amendment purposes. 
A different argument, the one proposed here, draws on the identity princi-
ple as a core commitment of criminal justice and due process.564 Justice Breyer 
recently remarked that an offender who has been on death row a long time may 
eventually “f[i]nd himself a changed human being.”565 It is unclear how literal-
ly the Justice intended this isolated remark, but it is advanced quite literally 
here. If the general thrust of this Article holds, then inmates’ criminal identities 
likely do change as they sit for decades on death row, especially if they started 
in their youth. Other scholars have focused on the influence of disorders like 
insanity566 and late-stage dementia.567 For demented individuals like Vernon 
Madison, the impression of a change in identity is so tragically palpable be-
cause there are striking physical causes and observable neurological manifesta-
                                                                                                                 
 560 Madison I, 139 S. Ct. at 731 (“The sole question on which Madison’s competency depends is 
whether he can reach a ‘rational understanding’ of why the State wants to execute him.”); Brief of 
Respondent, supra note 7, at 32–34 (“But not one State has proscribed the use of capital punishment 
against prisoners with dementia-induced memory loss.”). 
 561 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 934. 
 562 Dunn, 138 S. Ct. at 12. 
 563 Id. (“Madison understands both that he was tried and imprisoned for murder and that Alabama 
will put him to death as punishment for that crime.”). 
 564 Paige Kaneb, Innocence Presumed: A New Analysis of Innocence as a Constitutional Claim, 
50 CAL. W. L. REV. 171, 209 (2014) (describing “the emerging modern consensus that . . . the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires judicial review of compelling claims of inno-
cence, irrespective of how long after conviction new evidence is discovered”). 
 565 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2769 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 566 Flanders, supra note 16, at 465 (raising and setting aside a role for insanity in the law’s under-
standing of personal identity). 
 567 See Dufner, supra note 62, at 149–50 (arguing that a person with dementia may have had such 
an identity change that continual punishment of that individual is no longer justified). 
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tions—parts of his brain tissue are literally dying.568 But normal processes of 
psychological development and identity (re)formation can also bring about 
breaks in identity that brain scans looking for disease will not reveal. After this 
happens, whether by nature or disease, execution would violate the identity 
principle. 
There are a range of mechanisms that could address the concern about 
identity change for long-term death row inmates.569 The most inmate-
protective approach would be to institute a limitations period at the expiration 
of which the state must release death-row inmates (at least to the general pris-
on population). The length of the limitations period could be based off data 
about general rates of psychological change and development among inmate 
populations. Automatic release, however, would probably not be ideal. As with 
any rule, there will be an error rate, and the consequences of an error—
releasing an inmate who has committed and is still disposed to commit crime 
qualifying for the death penalty570—could be high. A better approach would be 
to apply a presumption that an inmate’s identity changes after a set period, and 
then offer the government a hearing to rebut the presumption. This allows the 
government to identify individual cases where release would be inappropriate 
and, therefore, endanger the population into which the inmate would be re-
leased. 
A third approach, the least protective of inmates, would put the burden on 
inmates and allow them to argue that their identities have changed after a peri-
od. One significant advantage of this route is that it draws on existing habeas 
mechanisms.571 The structure of an inmate’s claim would be that evidence of a 
                                                                                                                 
 568 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 13, at 8. 
 569 One mechanism not considered, but which would address the concerns about identity, would 
be to narrow the time between conviction and execution. See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 
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Conviction Claims: Idaho’s Flawed Process, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 85, 120–21 (2000) (“Expe-
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discovered evidence.”). 
 570 Only serious crimes can qualify someone for the death penalty. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 
U.S. 407, 437 (2008) (“As it relates to crimes against individuals, though, the death penalty should not 
be expanded to instances where the victim’s life was not taken.”). 
 571 Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows courts to entertain motions for new 
trials “in the interest of justice” if the defendant discovers new evidence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a). Such 
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change in identity amounts to newly discovered evidence of innocence—that 
he, the person sitting on death row, is not (is no longer) the person who com-
mitted the crime.572 Forty-nine states have habeas procedures in place for post-
conviction claims of innocence and impose no time limits on when such claims 
can be made.573 Under federal law, a habeas petitioner may have his “constitu-
tional claim considered on the merits if he makes a proper showing of actual 
innocence.”574 
The habeas claims envisioned here would not always fit easily into pres-
ently available legal categories. “A criminal defendant proved guilty after a 
fair trial does not have the same liberty interests as a free man.”575 As such, 
bare claims of innocence are not always sufficient to guarantee habeas re-
view.576 Habeas claims sometimes must allege some further defect—
procedural, evidentiary, or otherwise—in the original conviction.577 A death 
row inmate claiming that his identity has changed might even concede that the 
original conviction and sentencing were proper. Because of the long delay, the 
argument would go, it is no longer he who went to trial. 
One concern with releasing death row inmates whose identities have 
changed in less extreme cases than Vernon Madison’s—where there is neuro-
logical evidence of his mental decline—is that inmates could feign and malin-
                                                                                                                 
motions, however, must be made within three years of conviction, which is too short a period for 
present purposes. Id. 33(b)(1). 
 572 Michael J. Muskat, Note, Substantive Justice and State Interests in the Aftermath of Herrera v. 
Collins: Finding an Adequate Process for the Resolution of Bare Innocence Claims Through State 
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nations. Specifically, it encompasses the notion that the appellate process should identify and correct 
instances in which innocent people have been convicted. Substantive justice is most implicated in a 
capital case, in which a prisoner’s execution is irreversible.” (footnote omitted)). 
 573 Kaneb, supra note 564, at 203–08; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.72.020(b)(2), 12.72.010(4) 
(2018) (providing for “vacation of [their] conviction or sentence in the interest of justice” for inmates 
who can “establish[] by clear and convincing evidence that [they are] innocent” using “newly discov-
ered evidence”). 
 574 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993). 
 575 Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68 (2009). 
 576 House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006) (“As a general rule, claims forfeited under state law 
may support federal habeas relief only if the prisoner demonstrates cause for the default and prejudice 
from the asserted error.”). 
 577 McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013) (“We have not resolved whether a prisoner 
may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.”); House, 547 U.S. 
at 536. If a state offered no procedure for post-conviction review, then a claim of innocence would be 
enough to get into federal court. See Note, Herrera v. Collins: The Right of Innocence: An Unrecog-
nized Constitutional Privilege, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 258, 271 (1993) (“The [Herrera] Court, however, 
determined for the sake of argument that Herrera could bring a federal habeas petition of actual inno-
cence if there were no state procedures through which he could present a claim.”). 
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ger.578 “[T]he potential for false claims . . . in this context is obviously enor-
mous.”579 Psychological evaluation could aid judges who are asked whether an 
inmate’s identity has changed; however, these would necessarily rely largely 
on information provided by the inmate himself. This obviously complicates the 
fact-finding process. Even so, if, as this Article argues, people’s identities can 
change over time, the criminal justice system must engage in precisely this 
complicated factfinding rather than risk executing another innocent person. 
CONCLUSION 
Criminal law sometimes seems to think it exists outside of time. Adult-
hood and death mark the beginning and the end of its domain, but criminal law 
often flattens the decades between so that old crimes may still be prosecuted 
and old sentences still carried out. But, we, the people subject to criminal law, 
must exist in time. Between adulthood and death, time changes us. This Article 
has argued that criminal justice must take heed. As we change, so should crim-
inal law’s interest in us. Old crimes that criminal law currently attributes to us 
may, in a very real sense, no longer be ours. 
This Article has laid out the philosophy and psychology behind the chal-
lenge that personal identity poses to current criminal justice doctrines, policies, 
and institutions. Personal identity is sustained by psychological connections 
between past, present, and future versions of ourselves. Natural processes of 
growth and development attenuate these connections—the more time that 
elapses, the fewer psychological connections will remain between any two 
selves. At some point, there are so few connections that criminal law should 
recognize that a person’s identity has changed. After that point, a person 
should be free from prosecution or punishment for crimes committed by a dif-
ferent, past self. 
To tailor these general philosophical and psychological observations to 
criminal law, this Article offered its own account of “criminal identity.” Ac-
cording to this account, a criminal’s identity is tied to whatever characterologi-
cal traits disposed her to commit her crime. If, at some future point, she out-
grows enough of these traits, her criminal identity changes. This account can 
show why criminal law should have no further interest in people like Vernon 
Madison, who have undergone severe and tragic changes in criminal identity. 
It can also show why the criminal law should, more generally, be prosecuting 
                                                                                                                 
 578 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 7, at 45 (“[A] rule prohibiting the execution of those who 
cannot remember committing their crime would create new opportunities for malingering and eva-
sion.”). 
 579 Ford, 477 U.S. at 429 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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fewer people and punishing them less harshly. Everyone changes through natu-
ral psychological processes; we will all eventually become different people. 
One remaining question is whether, stepping back from philosophy and 
psychology, this account of criminal identity is appealing. For those interested 
in criminal justice reform, this account leads to several attractive proposals, 
including a rejuvenated system of juvenile justice, fewer inmates awaiting cap-
ital punishment, and shorter prison sentences. But this account is also more 
than a means to an appealing end. At each step of the way, it has grounded it-
self in ordinary intuitions and recent psychological data about identity and re-
sponsibility across time. Though society may sometimes forget in the heat of 
the moment, it recognizes that people are always changing. After enough time 
passes, people know that harping on the old slight becomes inappropriate and 
petty. This is not because the slight stings any less when recalled. Rather, it is 
because the person behind the slight is probably not around anymore; that per-
son has changed and become someone new. To hold her to account feels in-
congruous because, to her, that moment from long ago likely feels remote and 
foreign—like the act of a different person. A criminal justice system that in-
corporates these insights would feel more familiar, not less. It would resonate 
with our understanding of ourselves, and the limits on our selves. 
  
 
